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Non-technical summary
The telecommunication sector is influenced by various political powers: The European
Parliament, together with the European Commission, fosters the European integration
process in network-based markets and uses alternative strategies to align national regula-
tory systems. National governments support this European integration strategy. How-
ever, they follow also national aims which are not necessarily in line with the Euro-
pean integration process. Finally, sub-national governments know of the importance of
telecommunications for regional economic development and, therefore, seek to attract
(support for) infrastructure investments.
In this paper, I analyze the intermediate role of national governments between pan-
European aims and national and sub-national aims. I first consider pan-European
regulation guidelines and instruments to tackle the integration process. One key ve-
hicle in this context are the Regulatory Packages which should provide guidelines during
the transition of European telecommunication markets from monopolistic national mar-
kets to integrated European-wide competitive markets. National lawmakers transform
these guidelines to national laws taking into account national specificities and national
regulators control their adoption to markets.
However, national governments have been (and still are) engaged in national telecommu-
nication markets in multiple roles: Former monopolists were under governmental control
for a long period of time even after the liberalization and, in many countries, governments
still keep the majority of shares today. Meanwhile, governments have a strong impact on
strategic regulatory decisions and, finally, see the availability of an adequate telecommu-
nication infrastructure as a major requirement for economic growth. For internalizing
the growing positive externalities provided by the availability of telecommunications,
public support in infrastructure projects is a key pre-requisite. Comparing the situation
across alternative member states shows that the ambiguous roles of governments had a
strong impact on the development of competition in telecommunication markets after
the liberalization.
Based on early experience shortly after the liberalization, the European Commission
seeks to separate the alternative roles of governments from each other. However, the
practical implementation is a major challenges even ten years after the liberalization.
As the infrastructure is the key input for providing telecommunication services, com-
prehensive investments require an integrated regulatory approach where incentives to
invest and to operate the infrastructure have to be controlled and enforced by regulators
with adequate decision powers to support the European integration process. This issue
becomes even more relevant when taking into account the importance of telecommuni-
cations in the European economic growth process after the financial crisis.
I discuss the role of the government bearing in mind market-oriented competition argu-
ments which mainly demand the separation of the roles of the governments and also more
macroeconomic oriented arguments which demand an integrated guidance taking into
consideration the key role of telecommunications for other sectors. Finally, I consider the
alternative approaches in the light of the latest Regulatory Package which was installed
in December 2009 and discuss the role of governments under these new guidelines.
Das Wichtigste in Kürze
Der Telekommunikationssektor wird durch unterschiedliche politische Kräfte beeinflusst:
Das Europäische Parlament, gemeinsam mit der Europäischen Kommission, verfolgt den
europäischen Integrationsprozess in netzbasierten Märkten und wendet unterschiedliche
Strategien an, um nationale Regulierungssysteme einander anzugleichen. Nationale
Regierungen unterstützen dieses Ziel. Sie verfolgen aber auch nationale Ziele, die nicht
notwendigerweise mit dem europäischen Integrationsprozess vereinbar sind. Regionale
und kommunale Verwaltungen wissen um die Bedeutung der Telekommunikationsin-
frastruktur für ihre regionale ökonomische Entwicklung und fordern daher eine Unter-
stützung bei Investitionen durch regionale Förderprogramme.
In diesem Papier betrachte ich die Rolle nationaler Regierungen zwischen europäischen,
nationalen und regionalen Zielen. Zunächst werden überblickhaft europäische Vorgaben
und Instrumente vorgestellt, mit deren Hilfe der Integrationsprozess gelenkt wird. Das
zentrale Steuerungsinstrument sind dabei die Regulierungspakete, die Vorgaben für den
langfristigen Übergang vormals monopolistischer nationaler Märkte zu einem europaweit
integrierten wettbewerblichen Telekommunikationsmarkt bieten. Nationale Gesetzge-
ber überführen diese Richtlinien in nationale Gesetze unter Berücksichtigung nationaler
Besonderheiten und nationale Regulierungsbehörden lenken und kontrollieren die Um-
setzung in nationalen Märkten.
Dennoch ist die öffentliche Hand in vielen Ländern auch nach der Liberalisierung noch
aktiv in nationalen Märkten in unterschiedlichen Rollen engagiert: Bei früheren Mon-
polisten sind öffentliche Eigentümer immernoch die Mehrheitseigentümer. Gleichzeitig
haben nationale Regierungen einen starken Einfluss auf strategische Regulierungsentschei-
dungen und verstehen die Bedeutung einer adäquaten Telekommunikationsinfrastruktur
als notwendige Voraussetzung für wirtschaftliches Wachstum. Um wachsende positive
Externalitäten aufgrund von Telekommunikationsinfrastruktur zu internalisieren, ist eine
verstärkt öffentliche Unterstützung beim Infrastrukturausbau eine wesentliche Voraus-
setzung. Der Vergleich zwischen verschiedenen Ländern zeigt, dass die unterschiedlichen
Rollen der öffentlichen Hand einen starken Einfluss auf die Entwicklung des Wettbe-
werbs in Telekommunikationsmärkten nach der Liberalisierung hatten.
Auf der Grundlage früher Erfahrungen kurz nach der Liberalisierung fordert die Eu-
ropäische Kommmission eine Separierung der unterschiedlichen staatlichen Rollen. Die
praktische Umsetzung ist allerdings eine große Herausforderung auch noch 10 Jahre nach
der Liberalisierung. Da die Infrastruktur der Schlüssel für das Angebot von qualita-
tiv hochwertigen Telekommunikationsdiensten ist, erfordern umfangreiche Investitionen
einen integrierten Regulierungsansatz, wobei Regulierer mit entsprechender Entschei-
dungsfähigkeit Anreize zur Investition und zum Betrieb von Infrastrukturen schaffen und
fördern sollten. Dies ist insbesondere im Hinblick auf die Schlüsselrolle von Telekommu-
nikation im europäischen Wachstumsprozess nach der Finanzkrise zu bedenken.
Ich vergleiche die unterschiedlichen Rollen der öffentlichen Hand unter Berücksichti-
gung von Wettbewerbsargumenten, die eine Separierung der Rollen fordern, mit eher
makroökonomisch orientierten Argumenten, die eine integrative Lenkung des Telekom-
munikationssektors als Schlüsselsektor zur Entwicklung anderer Sektoren berücksichti-
gen. In einem letzten Schritt diskutiere ich die Ergebnisse vor dem Hintergrund der
Veränderungen im Rahmen des letzten Regulierungspakets, das im Dezember 2009 einge-
führt wurde.
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1 Introduction
Multiple political powers affect regulation and, thus, the development of telecommuni-
cations on the European level, the national level and the sub-national level. The EU
Parliament and the EC seek to reach the objective of a pan-European integration of
member states’ telecommunication markets and provide the necessary regulatory instru-
ments on both the European and the national level. National governments support
this aim but are additionally interested in not losing national sovereignty. Moreover,
national governments follow aims, which are not primarily in line with the integration
process but which have to address individual member states’ goals and which have to
tackle individual member states’ challenges. Due to the key role of telecommunications
for economic development, national governments are comprehensively engaged in their
national telecommunication sectors in alternative roles. In this paper, I consider these
roles of national governments under the European regulatory framework with a partic-
ular focus on the implementation of the first two Regulatory Packages1 and how they
affect the development of national telecommunication markets.2
A number of studies exist which address the role of the government in particular indus-
tries. Seminal papers are the contributions by Stigler (1971) and Peltzman (1976) or,
more recently, Henisz and Zelner (2001). Persson and Tabellini (2000) and, subsequently,
Duso and Röller (2003) consider the political influence in the context of (de-)regulation.
While most studies analyze the role of the government in the economy or in regulated
sectors as a whole, the telecommunication sector provides a particular situation, firstly,
because of its key role as an input good for other industries and, secondly, because of its
historical background as a fully governmental controlled sector, which has been liberal-
ized. This background caused strong interrelationships between national governments
as well as public administrations and incumbent operators and led to personal inter-
dependencies between market participants and governments or between regulators and
governments. The strong interrelationships between political powers and telecommuni-
cation sectors are under the suspicion of the EC as they might influence competition
and the European integration process.
1These are the Regulatory Package of 1998 in line with the liberalization and the Regulatory Package
of 2002/2003 for the harmonization of national telecommunication markets preparing the integration
process.
2I concentrate on the governmental influence on the sector and, to a far extent, refrain from the reverse
influence where this is possible.
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Concerning network-based markets an ongoing debate exists among academics, politi-
cians and infrastructure and service providers about the compatibility of long-run in-
vestments with a sunk-cost character and competition on the infrastructure or, also,
between alternative infrastructures. The key regulatory challenge is the provision of
adequate investment incentives when competition keeps profits low. Against this back-
ground, Section 2 provides an overview of the European regulatory system with its in-
struments and how they are implemented to balance these static and dynamic regulation
aims. Moreover, I describe the discussion of competition promotion and infrastructure
investments based on the existing European regulatory system.
Section 3 considers the alternative roles of governments as the representatives of states
in the telecommunication sector. As lawmakers, governments determine the framework
for the development of the sector as a whole. Simultaneously, governments affect strate-
gic decisions of regulators as, in general, national parliaments elect the members of the
regulators’ presidential chambers, i.e. the strategic departments of regulators. On the
other hand, governments are involved in sector participants and directly influence sector
activities as, in most countries, they still keep minority stakes in telecommunication
operators and support the installation of infrastructure with public grants. Combining
the measures available in the alternative roles even increases regulatory powers to affect
sector activities and to control the sector as a whole. I use examples from the EC Im-
plementation Reports to consider the dichotomous roles of governments in the interplay
of investments, competition and regulation and compare the national outcomes.
Section 4 is an extension to the previous sections as it discusses main regulatory changes
of the Third Regulatory Package, which has to be adopted to national laws by June
2011, in the light of the current market situation. Thus, Section 4 provides an outlook
of expected future developments based on the current momentum in the European mar-
ket integration process. Section 5 concludes the paper and highlights some key aspects
which require further consideration also under the Third Regulatory Package.
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2 Regulation – the pan-European Perspective
This section provides an overview of European regulatory instruments mainly from the
EC perspective and, subsequently, discusses the double aim of competition enforcement
and investments in the context of the First and the Second Regulatory Package.
2.1 Instruments for Harmonizing Regulation in Europe
2.1.1 Regulatory Packages
The EC intends to merge individual telecommunication markets of EU member states
to one common EU-wide market and uses both ex ante and ex post measures to imple-
ment this comprehensive task. The key pre-requisite is the harmonization of national
telecommunication laws. Regulatory Packages determine the framework of regulation
harmonization as they provide the guidelines to be implemented to national laws in all
member states. Until today, two EC Regulatory Packages are effective. The first was
established in line with the liberalization in 1998 as a framework for the transition of
former monopolistic markets to efficient and competitive markets. The second was in-
troduced in 2002/2003 to continue the harmonization of national telecommunications
and to foster and to secure competition aims. Following the first proposal for this Sec-
ond Regulatory Package, it became necessary to introduce new rules, which meet the
unexpected technological and structural changes after liberalization.3
Each Regulatory Package covers a range of multiple guidelines ordered in directives which
give more detailed information about how regulation should be implemented on the na-
tional level. For example, the Second Regulatory Package consists of the Framework
Directive, which provides the general framework for the implementation of regulation,
and five specific directives, which all cover a particular issue in national markets.4 Mem-
ber states are obliged to transpose these directives to national laws in a pre-determined
period of time taking into account country distinctions.
Due to the growing importance of customers as active information providers, the Third
Regulatory Package stronger secures the new role of customers fostering the pan-
3http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/topics/telecoms/regulatory/new_rf/
documents/com2000-393en.pdf
4The five specific directives are the Access Directive (2002/19/EC), the Authorization Directive
(2002/20/EC), the Universal Directive (2002/22/EC), the Directive on Privacy and Electronic Com-
munications (2002/58/EC) and the Directive on Competition in the Markets for Electronic Com-
munications Networks and Services (2002/77/EC). Please also see Figure 5 in Appendix .
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European integration of telecommunication markets. This last Regulatory Package was
set up after the second round of market reviews in 2006, was introduced in December
2009 and has to be transposed to national laws by June 2011.
2.1.2 Monitoring and Controlling the Integration Process
While Regulatory Packages provide the strategic perspective for harmonizing European
regulation efforts, the EC uses alternative measures and institutions to smooth the long-
term regulatory process and to react on current issues. In particular, it demands a vivid
exchange of information based on public consultations with interested groups before
adopting new regulatory steps or adjusting current regulations. Considering the moni-
toring procedure, NRAs are obliged to analyze markets on a regular basis and consider
whether companies with SMP exist. The results of these analyses are reported to the EC
(Framework Directive, article 16). This individual market information offers a compre-
hensive knowledge stock about national markets as a whole, individual companies with
SMP and also NRAs, national laws and particular aspects of national regulation habits.
Based on this information and on own monitoring results, the EC directly intervenes in
telecommunication markets if it suspects the situation in a market not to be in line with
the EU regulatory framework.
The EC uses mainly three types of instruments to intervene on current regulatory issues
depending on the addressee: Firstly, the most comprehensive intervention refers to a
particular market type across all member states. It is adopted if the EC expects Regula-
tory Packages not to meet a particular issue, due to changes in the market structure or
due to technological changes (cross-market interventions). Secondly, the EC addresses
a member state market if it suspects national regulation to be insufficient or if current
or forthcoming regulatory practices benefit one company over its competitors (country-
addressing interventions). An example, which will be discussed below, is the roll-out of
high-speed internet in Germany. Thirdly, the last type of interventions addresses single
companies or a group of companies if SMP is abused (company-specific interventions).
While the first two types require reactions by national institutions, the government or
the regulator, the last type directly addresses individual companies and, thus, comprises
the gray area between regulation and antitrust.5
Alternative approaches in line with the harmonization and integration of European
telecommunication markets offer a comprehensive set of instruments for the regulation
5More detailed information about the alternative instruments of the EC and how their execution affects
markets and companies is provided in Veith (2010b).
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process which are primarily based on a top-down approach due to the coordination of
the European integration process (the Regulatory Packages, the monitoring procedures).
On the other hand, reverse loops are installed providing input to the EC (consultations
with NRAs and other interested groups). Moreover, national distinctions are explicitly
recognized in the transposition process of Regulatory Packages to national laws. With
this combination of reverse monitoring and controlling mechanisms, the integration pro-
cess allows for comprehensive sovereignty of national member states. However, national
governments use their sovereignty to follow own aims with national telecommunication
sectors, which are not necessarily in line with the pan-European integration aim as will
be discussed in Section 3.
2.2 Investments and Competition
Telecommunications experienced a comprehensive technological change in transmission
technologies between the late 1990s and about 2004. Radical technological innovations
enable much higher transmission rates, which allow for higher-quality services on the ex-
isting infrastructure.6 Although improvements in the transmission technology encourage
higher-quality services, the majority of the existent physical infrastructure components
remain on their basic level. In consequence, an increasing gap between physical in-
frastructure development and the transmission technology development exacerbates the
internalization of service profits by physical infrastructure operators.
Service providers take up the potential of higher transmission capacities, firstly, by
providing more services and, secondly, by providing higher-quality services. This differ-
entiation on the service level increases the attractiveness of telecommunication usage as
a whole. As a result, transmission system innovations moves telecommunication markets
from a "supply push" situation to a "demand pull" situation.7
However, the introduction and protection of efficiency and competition is an ongoing
challenge within the European integration process. After competition has been in-
stalled on the service level, the cumbersome task to be solved is local loop competition,
which requires NRAs’ and competition authorities’ attention until today. As infrastruc-
ture providers bear the risk of (not) re-financing investments, they choose the level of
6Think of, e.g., ADSL, which requires physical adjustments in the street cabinets to enable higher
speed services like, e.g., VoIP services (De Bijl and Peitz, 2005).
7The impact of service competition on infrastructure provision is considered in Veith (2010a) in more
detail.
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infrastructure availability based on company-specific strategic aims but ignore positive
externalities provided by their investments. Following Knieps (2007) and Bauer and
Bohlin (2007), national telecommunication laws must strictly determine the environ-
ment for efficient local loop access negotiations. Consensus exists among politicians,
NRAs and telecommunication companies on the essential facility property of the local
loop. However, the guidelines in the Second Regulatory Package leave room for inter-
pretation resulting in additional challenges in the national transposition process. As
the Regulatory Packages provide no further details on how to implement directives to
national laws, lawmakers on the national level have repeatedly chosen an insufficient
level of concreteness in the transposition process.
In a nutshell, the EC follows the aim of telecommunication market integration across
all EU member states with alternative instruments, which include directed and indi-
rected interventions and ex ante and ex post monitoring and controlling instruments.
Regulatory Packages are the key vehicle as they prepare the steps to the integration
and guide the comprehensive preparations. The rules provided in this framework have
to be transposed to national laws by national governments taking into account national
distinctions. As EU member states are at different stages of market competition and
infrastructure availability and quality, the guidelines are set at a very high level of ab-
straction. This provides a particular challenge for NRAs’ implementation to markets as
national transpositions of highly abstractive guidelines also result in a low level of con-
creteness in many national telecommunication laws. Moreover, insufficient transposition
and in-transparent decision-making on the national stage hamper both competition and,
in particular, investments in many EU member states.
3 The Dichotomous Roles of Governments in the
Telecommunication Sector
Due to the high impact of telecommunications on other sectors, national governments
follow multiple dichotomous aims in telecommunication markets. These aims are the
transposition of the EU guidelines as well as the installation of a sufficiently high level
of infrastructure and service quality and the installation of competition and efficiency.
However, they also comprise individual national aims, which directly and indirectly affect
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the transposition process. Until today, most EU member states are actively engaged in
their telecommunication sectors by keeping shares and stakes in the incumbent operator
and by providing legal and financial incentives for infrastructure investments. Following
Levy and Spiller (1994, 1996), institutional endowments of countries in a sector influ-
ence the implementation of regulatory rules and directly affect the strategic behavior of
regulated companies.
Turning to the link between infrastructure provision and users, governments use their in-
terrelationship to sector companies to support the installation of adequate infrastructure
quality and availability. Based on the Universal Service Directive and the Framework
Directive (2002/21/EC, Article 8.2), national governments have to balance the roll-out
of high quality infrastructure in more profitable regions and the availability of an ade-
quate level of infrastructure quality in less profitable regions. Thus, they have to keep
the urban-rural quality differential as low as possible. While this is of minor importance
for smaller countries such as the Netherlands, it is a major problem for larger countries
with a lower population concentration such as France or Germany. In densely popu-
lated areas, companies voluntarily invest as they expect to re-finance their investments
in a shorter period of time. In contrast, infrastructure providers are less interested in
investing in less densely populated areas because of a lower return-on-investments ra-
tio. Therefore, investments in rural areas are enforced by universal service obligations
and public funding to guarantee a basic level of infrastructure capacity. In the follow-
ing, I consider alternative roles with which governments influence telecommunication
competition and investments, how they are implemented and how they interact.
3.1 Governments as Lawmakers and Providers of the National
Regulatory System
Governments have to develop and maintain a legal system, which adopts the alternative
propositions on infrastructure provision and competition derived from the Regulatory
Packages. On the one hand, such a system determines the framework for the current
market situation and, on the other hand, it has to be flexible for adjustments in the
market structure and in technological developments. Thus, such a framework has to
balance static and dynamic regulation aims depending on the underlying intention of
governments. The EC is aware of these challenges for national policymakers in the
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transposition process and allows for flexibility, firstly, with regard to adjustments to
national distinctions, secondly, in terms of transposition time and, thirdly, due to the
concreteness and wording of national laws.
National distinctions comprise geographical and demographical as well as cultural dif-
ferences and distinctions in national administrative systems. While geographical and
demographical aspects are observable and could easily be monitored by European ad-
ministrations, cultural distinctions and, in particular, aspects depending on national
administrative systems are not fix requisites but could mostly be adjusted only with a
long-term perspective. This is a key challenge in the telecommunication sector: The
administrative system is strongly based on the sector structure before the liberalization
with one publicly owned telecommunication provider and a low level of technological
change. However, this system hardly meets the market development after the introduc-
tion of competition, which hampers the position of competitors due to lagging regulatory
flexibility.
The transposition time is the time span between the introduction of a new Regula-
tory Package and the finalization of its implementation to the national law. While
the Regulatory Package determines a final date for the transposition, this requirement
provokes criticisms by the EC as national governments have intentionally extended the
transposition process. In particular, when transposing the First Regulatory Package,
many countries needed more time than the pre-determined period. In less innovative
industries, an extension of the implementation time shifts upcoming competition to the
future. However, in the telecommunication sector, the extension of the first transposi-
tion period came together with the implementation of more comprehensive transmission
technologies in fix-line markets (broadband for private customers). Thus, the extension
of the transposition period enabled incumbent operators to establish their customer base
with no or only little competition, which provided an increasing first-mover advantage.
Based on long-lasting contracts, customers were locked in with their providers. Con-
sequently, even the EC requirement of local loop unbundling in 2000 (Regulation No.
2887/2000/EC) has had only a weak effect on competition.
Turning to the third aspect, due to their long-term perspective, infrastructure invest-
ments require non-ambiguous legal rules and a highly transparent regulation pattern,
which enable investors to foresee future steps of major adjustments in telecommunica-
tion laws. A less concrete level of national law wording offers room for interpretation
driving the workload of national and European courts. Therefore, both incumbent and
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Table 1: National Lawmaking against the Background of the EU Regulatory Guidelines
Year Country Statement/Concern
1997 UK Main principles of the first regulatory package became effective.
UK Authorities have hampered local loop access for competitors arguing that the access to the copper 
loop would not improve local loop competition. In contrast, such a step would jeopardize the 
development of facility-based competition.
1998 Germany The incumbent was required to offer unbundled local loop access but only for fully unbundled raw 
copper lines.
1999 Sweden The Swedish regulator PTS proposed an amendment to the national Telecommunications Act which 
enables PTS to unbundle the local loop through licensing conditions.
before 
2000
Nether-
lands
Main Distribution Frame (MDF) access was considered to be a form of special access what 
contradicted the habits in other countries.
2000 France Competitors argued that shortcomings in the administrative power of the regulator hamper upcoming 
competition on the local loop. Moreover, disputes about ADSL provision would have resulted in a 
barrier to competition, this particularly affects the entry of smaller and medium competitors. In their 
perspective, public authorities failed to act decisively on the behavior of the incumbent. In 
consequence, the incumbent operator was able to expand his strong and even dominant position in 
the broadband market.
2001 France The EC points out decisive delays in the implementation of local loop competition and the access to 
collocation sites what would be mainly due to the absence of clear and effective enforcement 
procedures.
Nether-
lands
From 31 December 2000 until mid September 2001, in the crucial time period of local loop 
unbundling and ADSL roll-out of the incumbent, OPTA was appointed as the Dutch regulator but 
was not designated as the NRA in charge of executing EC regulation what led to significant delays in 
the introduction of full unbundled local loop accesses in the Netherlands.
Sweden The Swedish Telecommunications Act does not provide the powers to the NRA to demand for the 
introduction of flatrate internet access call origination (FRIACO) which is found to be a central 
requisite for retail competition in other countries.
2004 Germany The German Telecommunications Acts categorizes market squeezing as an abusive strategy. 
However, the EC doubtfully raises concerns given potentially positive effects on competition. A 
corresponding resale obligation is also limited until 30 June 2008 and covers only the resale of 
access services which is bundled with other services.
Nether-
lands
The attempt to impose a bitstream access obligation on the fixed-line incumbent operator has been 
annulled in the court of justice as the obligation could not be derived from the relevant applicable 
legislation. 
Source: Information taken from the respective EC Implementation reports (1998, 1999, 2000, 2001,
2004, 2005).
entrant infrastructure providers demand a high level of concreteness in law wordings.
Examples, which concern these issues are provided in Table 1. Let us shortly consider
the case of local loop unbundling in Sweden as it comprises all three aspects: While
95 percent of Swedish households had access to multiple networks already in 1999 (which
mainly comprises fix-line and mobile access), local loop competition was suspected by
the Swedish regulator PTS to be insufficient at the time. Therefore, it proposed amend-
ments to the telecommunication law forcing vertically integrated providers with SMP
to let competitors into their markets on a cost-based access price. As the Swedish
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government suspected the proposal of PTS to infringe the Swedish constitution, the
process of law adjustments delayed local loop access regulation until 2004. Meanwhile,
from 31 December 2000 onwards, EU regulation required operators with SMP in the local
loop to provide offers for access to competitors. In consequence, the Swedish incumbent
voluntarily opened the local loop for competitors but it chose access prices which were
in-competitively high as explained by entrant candidates. Turning to the challenge of
lawmaking, the inflexible administrative system caused an insufficient implementation of
legal rules providing a significant first-mover advantage to the incumbent. This affected
local loop competition for a comprehensive period of time even after the adjustment of
the law.
3.2 NRAs: From Ministry Departments to (In)Dependent Public
Institutions
TheWTO (1996) describes an independent regulator as a regulator being "separate from,
and not accountable to, any supplier of basic telecommunications services".8 While this
definition relies on the direct interrelationship of the regulator and the regulated market,
the EU regulatory approach extends this definition to the interrelationship of regulated
companies and political authorities (Article 3 of the Framework Directive). Moreover,
the Framework Directive and the Universal Service Directive require NRAs to control
and support users’ security interests. The stricter separation of companies and the na-
tional administrative system and the simultaneous support of users’ rights overweight
the demand side in the European regulatory system.
Independence of NRAs is legally guaranteed by allocating the administration of shares
of telecommunication companies and ownership tasks in different departments than the
super-ordinated ministry of the NRA. However, the EC repeatedly raised concerns about
the actual implementation of such a separation during the first years after the liberaliza-
tion and still worries about separation in some member states such as France and, most
recently, the Czech Republic (Implementation Report 2008). One key point of criticism
is that NRAs are officially separated from governmental authorities in most countries
but are accountable to the parliament or other super-ordinated political powers, which
determine the legal definitions of NRAs’ decision space or budget constraints.
8http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres97_e/refpap-e.htm
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Most NRAs are historically derived from former ministries and adherent public
administrations. In consequence, NRAs have adopted personnel and employment struc-
tures from their predecessors both for strategic and lower hierarchy units. In most
countries, the members of the presidential chamber are elected by national parliaments,
nominated by the national president or the ministers in charge. Thus, the members of
the presidential chambers have proven consistency with the political parties of their elec-
tors before their election.9 Considering lower hierarchies, NRAs compete with regulated
companies for high-skilled employees on the job market. However, as in most EU member
states, NRA employees are civil servants, more comprehensive incentives such as higher
salaries and a broader perspective of personal development and flexibility make compa-
nies much more attractive for job market candidates (ECTA Regulatory Scorecard 2008,
executive summary).10 In many member states such as the UK or the Netherlands, this
job market competition between NRAs and regulated companies led to comprehensive
turnovers of NRA personnel after the liberalization and resulted in understaffed NRA
departments for multiple years. While regulators, such as OFTEL/OFCOM, are aware
of the challenge, they can hardly intervene due to requirements of national lawmak-
ers(Implementation Reports 2000, 2001). Moreover, NRA employees were (and still are)
poached by regulated companies, which, firstly, hampers the creation of specific expertise
and, secondly, leads to a migration of the existing knowledge stock from NRAs. Deficits
in human resource management and, as a consequence, knowledge management hamper
the implementation of sustaining regulatory policies.
Additional problems are directly derived from the weakness of human resource man-
agement: New entrants complain about the very short-term oriented regulation focus.
Following their view arguments, NRAs mainly consider single market aspects but ignore
more urgent, broader challenges leading to delays of market developments and providing
uncertainty. In particular, new entrants and the EC raised concerns that inefficiencies
of NRAs enable incumbent providers to stabilize or even increase their market power.
Examples on resulting challenges in local loop competition and investments comprise ne-
gotiation time rulings and penalties in the context of local loop access (Germany, 2000),
ADSL wholesale pricing (Germany, 2001) or the lack of regulatory interventions in line
with incumbents’ aggressive pricing mechanisms (Sweden, 2001, and France, 2004).
9See the discussion in the Special Opinion (’Sondergutachten’) 2003 and 2009 , two monitoring reports
of the German Monopolies Commission.
10The ECTA (European Competitive Telecommunications Association) supports regulation activities
in the interest of entrants to telecommunication markets.
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As most European NRAs are derived from former ministries or subordinated govern-
ment agencies, they keep their previous organizational structure. While this structure
met the requirements of monopolistic markets with low technological deployments and a
constant market structure, problems occur with the transition to more dynamic markets
with ongoing comprehensive technological developments. Even today, the EC expresses
concerns about the efficiency of developing decision processes in NRAs and argues that
the lack of timely and pro-active decisions creates barriers to competition and invest-
ments. Following the EC argumentation, inflexibility within the organizational structure
of NRAs hampers the transition process and the installation of innovative markets.
Some NRAs, in cooperation with their governments, have taken up the criticisms and
restructured the internal organization to become more market-oriented as done in the
Netherlands or Sweden. Other approaches, such as the UK example, also include the
integration of telecommunication-related antitrust tasks and market controls into the
scope of NRAs’ duties.11 These reorganizations prove department boundaries to become
much more permeable for personnel qualified in particular fields of relevance and allow
the creation of a flexible, project-oriented knowledge stock within NRAs not fixed to
individual employees. Reorganization with the focus on market-orientation made OF-
COM a commonly acknowledged group of highly skilled experts who consult the British
government as well as the EC in line with regulation and investment decisions.
In consequence, the UK example is repeatedly considered as a benchmark for other
NRAs: ECTA recommends that NRAs in other EU member states should receive even
more complex regulatory powers including also the possibility of functional separation
of regulated companies or decision rights on fining abusive companies based on their
turnover.12 After the functional separation of BT and its local loop unit Openreach in
the UK, other NRAs, such as OPTA and PTS, also analyzed whether this approach
could be transposed to their countries. However, they refrained from giving a recom-
mendation to their governments due to strong differences to the UK situation. Whether
a NRA should be equipped with antitrust instruments to stimulate the double-aim of
downstream competition and high-quality infrastructure investments is criticized in the
economic literature. In particular, Cave (2006b) and Whalley and Curwen (2008) ar-
gue that functional separation within the British incumbent did not have the expected
11This increase in regulator’s powers goes in hand with a reduction of antitrust authorities’ competen-
cies.
12See the ECTA Regulatory Scorecard (2008).
15
success as the complexity of the task would be too comprehensive for OFCOM with its
current personnel and its financial constraints.
Much more attention is paid to the opposite position for NRAs as the Implementation
Reports give multiple examples for an insufficient decision space of NRAs. Concerning
the interconnection of alternative infrastructures and the access of service providers to
the local loop, the French regulator ART was able to intervene in negotiations only if
one company formally requested its support or after negotiations have demonstrably
failed. New entrants argued that this approach significantly delays upcoming competi-
tion. However, even after legal adjustments for increasing ART’s powers in 2001, the
regulator did not modify its rules of procedures. In consequence, the incumbent France
Telecom regularly questioned the decisions of the regulator bringing cases to courts.
As long as court decisions are pending, this hampers competition-increasing actions by
market participants and delays infrastructure investments due to missing legal certainty.
Based on this and other examples, the EC suspects incumbents strategically to extend
the process of the implementation of regulatory steps by challenging NRAs’ decisions, as
they know of the high workload of national courts. Such examples provide evidence that,
besides lawmaking, also organizational and functional slack within regulatory agencies
cause legal uncertainty and, thus, reluctance in investments.
In a nutshell, national governments comprehensively affect the strategic orientation of
regulators: Firstly, they elect the members of the presidential chambers and, as lawmak-
ers, determine the decision space of regulators. Secondly, they also indirectly influence
the efficiency of NRAs by providing the status and incentive scheme for hiring NRA
employees. While NRAs’ organizational structures are derived from the predecessor or-
ganizations, they are not willing to adjust internal structures, which could provide a
more case-based structure and, thus, accelerate regulatory decisions providing invest-
ment security. A magnitude of examples in the Implementation Reports show that
these short-comings also influence national market developments and also the European
integration process.
3.3 The Government and the Incumbent – Infrastructure
Provision
Turning from the legal system and the situation of regulators to the markets, we find most
governments to be minority stake-holders in national telecommunication incumbents
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even ten years after the beginning of privatization. Figure 1 displays that only the UK
and, finally, the Netherlands have completely withdrawn their involvement. In contrast,
in other EU-15 countries, public ownership shares were still above 25 percent in 2007.
This raises the question of governments’ intentions with minority stakes in former mo-
nopolists.
Figure 1: Public Ownership Share in the Incumbent
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Following the literature, multiple reasons exists for governments’ involvement in com-
panies. One key aspect for public participation is exercising control rights. Minority-
stake participation enables governments to affect strategic changes within the incumbent,
which comprise its separation or its acquisition by a competitor (Bel and Trillas, 2005).
As the EC has multiply brought cases to the European Court of Justice about Golden-
Shares rulings in member states,13 minority participation is a legal equivalent to secure
public interests.
13Examples are Portugal (2002) or Spain (2003).
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The EC heavily criticizes public involvements in former telecommunication monopolists
as it suspects such an ownership constellation to affect regulation and competition in the
telecommunication sector as a whole. The regulatory framework requires a strict sep-
aration of the regulatory agency-related authorities and the authorities administrating
shares in the incumbent provider to alleviate the challenge of governmental influence
on the sector development. However, in multiple cases, such as France before 2001 or
the Czech Republic even in 2008, the EC still expresses concerns about an adequate
implementation of separation.
Governments typically use control rights to follow sector-related or macroeconomic aims
such as infrastructure provision of adequate quality and infrastructure roll-out to stim-
ulate growth aims also in other sectors. The governmental intention of infrastructure
provision deviates from managers’ intention as telecommunication providers cannot com-
pletely internalize the economic benefits derived from infrastructure provision. Based on
control rights, governments are able to influence the decision process for long-term invest-
ments directly balancing infrastructure roll-out concerning regional reach and concerning
innovative technological infrastructure provision. Governments are aware of the capa-
bility of telecommunication infrastructure as an instrument for attracting high-potential
companies in international competition with other countries, also within the EU. Thus,
in contrast to the management of infrastructure providers, governments balance sector-
specific competition aims, i.e. static regulation aims, with macroeconomic aims, which
mainly refers to investments to provide a high-quality infrastructure for users.
While the EC cannot restrict a national government’s macroeconomic strategy (even if
this strategy causes rivalry among EU member states) it intervenes on the sector-level
if such a strategy benefits one company over competitors. Such a case recently occurred
in Germany, where the national government wanted to provide regulatory holidays to
the incumbent, so that it could roll out its very high-speed internet network (VDSL) to
selected cities. Consensus exists among providers, Deutsche Telekom and also its com-
petitors, and the government that VDSL will have a positive impact on economic growth
as a whole. However, the EC expected a first-mover advantage after the installation of
VDSL for the incumbent on the service level due to regulatory holidays. Therefore, it
abolished the decision of the German government and brought a case to the European
Court of Justice. The court followed the argumentation of the EC and, in December
2009, prohibited the necessary adjustments of the German telecommunication law.
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While governments are less interested in maximizing shareholder values, their key inter-
est lies in exercising control rights to follow sector aims and macroeconomic aims. In
contrast to managers, governments seek total welfare maximization, which differs from
profit maximization due to comprehensive positive externalities of telecommunications
on other industries.
3.4 State Aid and Active Public Participation
Comparing the situations before and after the liberalization shows that the role of
telecommunications has dramatically changed from a sector which provides subordinated
support for other sectors to one of the key sectors, if not the key sector, for economic
growth in all developing and developed countries.14 While physical infrastructure in-
vestments are a requirement not only for the development of the telecommunication
sector but for the economy as a whole, infrastructure operators can hardly internalize
the positive externalities which they provide to other sectors and households.15
State Aid is an instrument to control infrastructure investments from a macroeconomic
perspective compensating at least partially for externalities provided by a high-quality
infrastructure. It enables governments to install rules which separate infrastructure
installation from downstream competition, thus, reducing the potential first-mover chal-
lenge repeatedly mentioned in line with vertically integrated providers of an essential
facility.
Concerning the alternative instruments, I follow the EC definition of state aid:
"State aid is defined as an advantage in any form whatsoever conferred on a selective
basis to undertakings by national public authorities."16
Based on this very broad definition, direct financial support, i.e. either monetary sup-
port or asset support, and privileges, like tax reductions, or legal burden reductions, like
regulatory holidays, have to be distinguished.17
Both the EU and national authorities provide public aid in telecommunication markets
either to expand infrastructure quality in less lucrative regions or to increase infrastruc-
ture quality in economic key regions. Moreover, also regional and municipal authorities
14Röller and Waverman (2001) and also subsequent studies by Waverman find telecommunications and,
in particular, broadband to be a key driver of economic growth.
15The impact of service competition and the impact of derived demand for infrastructure is considered
in Veith (2010a).
16http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/overview/index_en.html
17An overview of state aid decisions since 2000 is provided in Table 2 in Appendix .
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support infrastructure investments. While European and national aid are mainly mon-
etary grants for infrastructure roll-out, on the lower administrative level, various addi-
tional forms of public support are in place, which even include public private partnerships
(PPP) with public authorities involved in administrative and control decision processes
of the network provider (comprehensively in Sweden and France).
Two types of public aid have to be considered separately, which are financial and non-
financial support.
Figure 2: Financial versus Non-Financial State Aid
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Financial Support
European authorities provide mainly financial support for network operators. In doing
so, they assist the infrastructure roll-out in less densely populated areas and in less devel-
oped countries. Financial support comprises a pre-determined, mostly fixed amount for
a particular project or part of a project. As a common level of infrastructure quality fa-
cilitates the integration of multiple national markets and the provision of similar services
across all member states, the EU has a strong interest to reduce quality differences in
single countries and across countries. A high infrastructure-quality level across all mem-
ber states provides a major advantage for attracting companies with an international
focus as a high quality telecommunication infrastructure complements the existing high
quality transportation infrastructure. The combination of both high-quality transporta-
tion infrastructure and high-quality telecommunication infrastructure are key assets for
European countries in worldwide competition.
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National governments offer both financial support and non-financial support for infras-
tructure roll-out. Financial grants are used to increase national infrastructure quality as
a whole or to reduce the urban-rural differential of infrastructure quality. In consequence,
financial grants foster the installation of new transmission technologies like broadband
as e.g. in Sweden. Sweden financed the installation of broadband infrastructure to the
centers of Swedish cities. While this strongly increased the acceptance of broadband
internet by the Swedish population at an early point in time, it also provided a major
advantage for the incumbent over new competitors, as it was the only Swedish provider,
which could afford the installation task at that time. In combination with the restrictive
regulatory policy and, thus, the low level of access competition, the competitive advan-
tage for the incumbent was even stronger. In France, an alternative state aid strategy
is in place in line with broadband initiations. Private broadband installation started at
Paris and the surroundings of Paris and major cities such as Montpellier or Lyon, while
rural areas were not that attractive for the incumbent and other providers. Therefore,
municipal administrations supported by the national government addressed the issue
funding broadband roll-out based on PPPs. As national and municipal administrations
subsequently demanded decision rights and an adequate return on investments in line
with local loop access, the EC heavily criticizes national and municipal governments’
claims (Implementation Report 2000).
Figure 3: Infrastructure Projects Accompanied by Financial Aid
If milestone is reached
further financial support 
for the next project
phase is provided
If milestone is reached
further financial support 
for the next project 
phase is provided
determination of the 
project and the inter-
mediate milestones 
to be reached 
A ard of Milestone 1
Financial Support
and Monitoring
Mil t 2
Financial Support
and Monitoring
TerminationTender w   
the Grant
Project
St t
 
Intermediate Check
es one 
Intermediate Check and Acceptance
time
Submissions
ar
Implementation of
Project Phase 1
Implementation of
Project Phase 2
Competition on the
Infrasutructure
21
Non-Financial Support
On the national and the sub-national levels, financial support is accompanied by ad-
ditional privileges. In contrast to financial support, non-financial approaches are un-
der much more discussion. Although the Access Directive requires non-discriminatory
end-to-end user access (Access Directive (2002/19/EC), Article 3(1)), the provision of
particular privileges enables infrastructure operators to discriminate between alternative
providers depending on the access price. Similar to financial support, privileges enable
the beneficiary to refund its investments. However, non-financial support requires a
more comprehensive set of rules, which guarantee the installation of an adequate path
to competition after the period of privileges while, simultaneously, investors must re-
finance their investments.
As already discussed in the previous subsection, VDSL roll-out in Germany is an exam-
ple for granting specific legal rights to an infrastructure provider. The German national
and the Länder-governments have amended the German telecommunication law in the
sense that new high-speed transmission technology is excluded from regulation.18 As de-
scribed above, the EC suspected a first-mover advantage for the incumbent as it would
be able to decide on competitors offering services on the new infrastructure (contradict-
ing Article 8 and other articles of the Framework Directive). However, the first-mover
advantage remains a point of discussion as the EC definition does not exclude privileges
for single investors from state aid.
Moreover, specific legal rules could be used as an instrument to provide investment in-
centives for single infrastructure providers or a small group of infrastructure providers.
But, in difference to most examples known from the past, such rules require a high level
of transparency and project knowledge both from monitoring and controlling institu-
tions and from the granted companies.19 In addition, depending on the complexity of
the project, pre-determined rules have to provide strict milestones, which are controlled
and, if necessary, enforced by the controlling institutions which should be the regulator.
However, transparent rules need not guarantee the success of the project but offer an
economically realistic perspective for investments and their refunding.
This aspect is of particular importance with regard to the critical mass effect in social
network-based markets. The critical mass describes the number of customers who are
necessary for the sustainable existence of a social network. It is assumed that customers
18Actually, the proposition did not grant the privilege to the incumbent. However, no alternative
infrastructure provider was able to benefit from this specific ruling.
19While these requirements should also accompany projects supported by a financial public grant, they
are only implemented in a small number of projects.
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attract new customers, e.g. based on "friendship"-programs being locked-in with a par-
ticular company due to network size and "friends" being with the same provider. Thus,
granting non-financial state aid must take into account the first-mover advantage of a
vertically integrated investor as it is a highly relevant aspect of refinancing the project.
In consequence, the phase of independent access control by the investor must be kept
flexible and has to be controlled very carefully by the regulator. Pre-determined and
commonly accepted rules have to be established at the beginning of the project. In
particular, the phase of independent access control does not need to cover the total
refinancing due to the first-mover advantage of the investor and the installed customer
group before competition is allowed.
Figure 4: Infrastructure Projects Accompanied by Non-Financial Aid
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Comparison of Financial and Non-Financial Support
Comparing projects with financial and with non-financial support (Figures 3 and 4)
shows that non-financial aid demands a longer period of project support as the re-
financing phase begins after the investment phase(s). In consequence, non-financial
support also requires a more complex preparation, as the critical mass aspect has to be
taken into consideration already in the project preparation phase. Non-financial state
aid shifts the balanced consideration of chances and project risks in the direction of
the investor as the responsibility for re-financing is with the investor. However, the
investor is also informed in much more detail about the status of investments than
the provider of a grant and also about the status of the project as a whole. Due to
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the ex-ante unclear development of the customer size, non-financial support demands
also much more flexibility in the post-investment phase. These additional assumptions
require a highly structured preparation of non-financial projects. However, adequate
preparation and training of NRA employees should already be installed for monitoring
public financial aid projects.
3.5 Combining Roles to Affect the Integration Process
While I have considered the dichotomous roles of the government separately so far, the
common effect of combining multiple strategies should not be ignored, as this could have
a much stronger impact on the sector and on market developments and could be used to
foster the European integration process even more than simply regulation can achieve.
An example of such a strategy is the combination of legal rule settings and public
grants to foster investments. Adequate and transparent rules are the pre-condition for
a sufficient tender. If lawmakers offer an adequate framework under which conditions
such tenders could be constructed and also enforced, this would facilitate the installation
of a grant and would strongly increase transparency during the implementation phases.
Another example in this direction is the provision of an adequate legal system and its
enforcement by the national regulator. A stronger proximity of regulators to markets
requires also an efficient internal structure, which enables a less bureaucratic and prompt
reaction to market changes. The information gained from such a proximity to markets
could also run into the long-term oriented provision of a sufficient legal system as is
shown in the UK.
On the other hand, governments could also follow the opposite strategy. Insufficient
lawmaking and, simultaneously, strategically delaying NRAs’ decision powers hamper
the integration process.
However, while the EC intends to reduce the influence of national governments on the
telecommunication sector, positive examples provide evidence that it could use the long-
term interrelationship in the integration process to strengthen the European position
as a whole. E.g. coordinating national governments’ activities and their roles in the
national telecommunication sector could be used to foster the interconnection of national
infrastructures forming a pan-European telecommunication infrastructure to broaden the
basis for pan-European market integrations.
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The telecommunication sector is in the focus of a magnitude of governmental interven-
tions. I have highlighted mainly four key types of interrelationships between public
authorities and the sector with a particular focus on the challenges of investments and
the installation of competition, which are providing the legal framework for the sector
performance, affecting strategic decisions within the sector regulator, ownership partici-
pation of the former monopolist and public aid in the context of infrastructure projects.
The consideration focuses on problems learned from past cases and provides some intro-
ductory discussions based on the literature and EC recommendations. With regard to
the legal system and the regulatory structure, entrant companies and the EC repeatedly
mentioned the lack of contemporary and transparent regulatory rules and their imple-
mentation. With regard to companies and projects, the major challenge remains the
internalization of positive externalities from infrastructure provision on other industries
and customers.
4 Extension: The Third Regulatory Package
In December 2009, the European Parliament introduced the Third Regulatory Package,
which has to be implemented to national laws until mid 2011. This new regulatory
framework takes up various criticisms brought forward in line with its predecessors and
fosters the national implementation process by providing stricter rules. In this extension,
I consider the key changes in the light of the current market situations.20
4.1 Infrastructure Investments and Competition
As described above, the current regulatory framework balances the two aims of initiating
investments and enforcing competition and leaves the priority decision to national gov-
ernments and NRAs. National governments implement investment aims with varying
efforts, which results in different levels of national infrastructure qualities and infras-
tructure competition in particular in the local loop.21 The new regulatory framework
attaches more attention to dynamic regulation aims, as the reviews under the current
Regulatory Package provided evidence for upcoming competition. Based on the aims of
the Lisbon Agenda, the new Regulatory Package further supports innovation aims on the
20A more detailed consideration of the changes in line with the Third Regulatory Package is provided
in Appendix . In this extension, I only consider the key changes concerning the discussions of the
previous sections.
21Please see Figure 6 in Appendix .
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service level by promoting the roll-out of high-quality infrastructure. In consequence,
the new regulatory framework demands the installation of regional lead-market projects
to foster the international competitiveness of the EU.
Turning from balanced competition and investment aims to a stronger focus on high-
quality-infrastructure investments, Article 8 of the 2002 Framework Directive on policy
objectives and regulatory principles has been comprehensively revised in two directions:
The proposal for Directive 2009/140/EC22, the amendment of Directive 2002/21/EC,
requires national governments and NRAs to appropriately take into account the risk
incurred by investors and proposes new forms of co-financing investments which have
already been implemented in single member states (adjustment 8h (5d)): In particular,
cooperative arrangements between infrastructure providers and service providers foster
the internalization of externalities of a high quality infrastructure.
While this adjustment is established to facilitate the integration of positive infrastruc-
ture externalities, it can only partially alleviate the existing challenge: Service providers
demand high upload rates and are therefore settled in regions with high infrastructure
quality, which means urban areas. Thus, service providers are not necessarily interested
in supporting the infrastructure roll-out in less-densely populated areas. As returns
on infrastructure installation in urban areas are higher and less risky, the integration
of service providers into the investment process alleviates the challenge of high quality
infrastructure provision in urban areas. However, such an approach increases the urban-
rural infrastructure quality differential without cross-regional subsidization.
Besides regional lead-market approaches for fix-line infrastructure quality, the new reg-
ulatory framework enhances facility-based local-loop competition by opening more (also
denser) radio frequency bands for public usage. Following the communication of 20
March 2006, titled "Bridging the Broadband Gap", the EC explicitly mentions fre-
quency bands to be an adequate and cheeper instrument for providing higher-quality
broadband access to less profitable regions. Although having lower transmission capac-
ities than fix-line broadband transmission systems, radio-frequency-based approaches
increase the existing level of broadband infrastructure in rural areas at lower costs com-
pared to fix-line infrastructure installation.
22http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/policy/ecomm/doc/tomorrow/reform/better_
regulation_directive/st03677_re06.en09.pdf
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Besides the increase in investment flexibility, the German Monopolies Commission high-
lights mainly five changes in line with the Third Regulatory Package in its latest Special
Opinion on telecommunication markets (Monopolies Commission, 2009), Co-Regulation,
Independence of NRAs, Functional Separation, the European Regulatory Body and the
Harmonized Implementation of Guidelines. I will shortly discuss them in the light of
the previous sections.
4.2 Co-Regulation
For a better harmonization of regulation in the EU member states the European Parlia-
ment introduced a new regulatory stage for national governments and NRAs. Drafts for
new market definitions, market analyses and the introduction of new regulatory mea-
sures have to be announced to the EC, other NRAs and the BEREC (Body of European
Regulators of Electronic Communication).23 Each of these institutions can provide fur-
ther suggestions and comments, which have to be taken into account when implementing
new measures. The EC and the BEREC can veto draft versions of market definitions
and market analyses in coordination with the other if they suspect the proposals not to
correspond with European guidelines.
In contrast to the previous regulatory approaches, this new instrument seeks a better
coordination of national regulations. However, it increases complexity as it requires
NRAs to inform other parties not familiar with the national situation about new regu-
latory steps and, additionally, it demands NRAs to analyze the regulatory approaches
brought forward in other member states. Thus, co-regulation comprehensively increases
the workload of NRAs and extends the implementation of regulation to the market.
Following the Special Opinion of the Monopolies Commission, this new approach com-
plicates the already complex regulatory system.24 While co-regulation should foster
the European integration process, it extends the national implementation of regulation,
which will expectedly reduces regulatory efficiency as a whole as examples in line with
the introduction of local loop unbundling have proven in many EU member states.
23More information on the BEREC is provided below and in Appendix .
24More information on this issue is provided in Veith (2010b).
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4.3 Independence of NRAs
Following the new Framework Directive, national regulatory bodies and the presidential
chambers shall become more independent from the national political system. In partic-
ular, when implementing European guidelines to national markets, the NRA shall not
be allowed to demand for consultative political support and it will also not be allowed
to accept such support. Moreover, presidents of NRAs and their vice-presidents must
not be dismissed without violating national requirements for their tasks.
These more stringent rules support the recommendations in line with the discussion on
NRAs’ dependence on national political systems under the Second Regulatory Pack-
age. While the current guidelines try to guarantee the independence of decisions by
separating the ministries in charge for administrating shares in the regulated incumbent
and the NRA, these new rulings additionally require the independence of the NRA as
far as possible from any political powers. This new independence reduces the broadly
suspected and also observable interference on NRAs. However, it remains to be seen
how this stronger sovereignty of NRAs affects regulation and the outcome of national
markets in terms of more competition and efficiency.
4.4 Functional Separation
Functional separation implies the separation of the network-operating unit and the ser-
vice unit of a vertically integrated company. Functional separation shall provide non-
discriminatory access conditions for service providers compared to the vertically inte-
grated operator, as this provider has a strong incentive to affect service competition
based on the access price or the access conditions to its essential input. This type of
separation has been introduced in the UK and in Denmark and has been considered as a
regulatory option also in other countries already under the Second Regulatory Package.
Multiple arguments brought forward in the literature question this approach at the
current stage of regulation and market competition. Firstly, functional separation is
not sufficiently defined in the Regulatory Package. Examples known from the eco-
nomic literature hint at the challenges of monitoring a functionally separated company
(Vickers (1995) for reasons of information asymmetry, Sappington (2006) for reasons of
non-price discrimination, and subsequent studies on these topics). Secondly, the analyses
of other NRAs after the UK approach and also the considerations in the economic liter-
ature (Cave, 2006b; Whalley and Curwen, 2008) show that the complexity of separation
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and monitoring the separated company might comprehensively increase the workload
of NRAs with their current organizational structures. Thirdly, the German Monopolies
Commission argues that functional separation is an extensive instrument, which should
have been implemented at an earlier stage of the transition process. But it will not
foster competition in the current, more developed situation of markets in the integration
process.
Following these alternative points of criticisms, it is not clear whether national regula-
tors will actually implement functional separation, in particular in EU-15 member states,
which questions the necessity of this instrument as a whole.
4.5 The pan-European Regulatory Body
The BEREC (Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications) will be a
common European regulatory body consisting of the heads of the national regulators,
which will support the EC in the adoption of new regulatory measures. In contrast to
its predecessor, the ERG, this new institution will not only consult the EC on national
issues but it will also have the opportunity to veto national regulatory measures if it
suspects them to be insufficient or not in line with European regulatory guidelines.
While its decision powers are more comprehensive than the decision rights of the ERG,
the BEREC is a trade-off solution, which leaves key competencies with national reg-
ulators and, thus, leaves major sovereignty at the national level. On the one hand,
decentralized regulators have a stronger proximity to national and sub-national markets
and, therefore, will probably react prompter to market issues in the future. On the other
hand, the current form of the BEREC’s decision rights with its veto powers complicates
the implementation of national regulatory decisions as not only the EC but also the
BEREC is allowed to intervene based on the co-regulation approach.
4.6 Harmonized Implementation of Guidelines
Previous regulatory measures by the EC had to be transposed to national laws taking
into account national distinctions. With the new Regulatory Package, the EC is able to
order how common regulatory rules have to be implemented to national markets. This
stricter ruling reduces national governments’ influence in the transposition process and,
in particular, also with the implementation of specific regulatory interventions.
One can show that directed European interventions reduce uncertainty in addressed mar-
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kets in comparison to indirected interventions (Veith, 2010b). However, the adoption of
a particular regulatory rule to a group of all member states’ markets ignores different
stages of competition or infrastructure quality. While this approach is a reasonable at-
tempt for harmonizing international telecommunication markets between member states,
ignoring national distinctions might, currently, enhance the acceptance in national mar-
kets. Therefore, it does not necessarily foster the integration process as national markets
still exhibit major technological and economic differences.
The Third Regulatory Package is to a far extent based on its predecessor regulatory
framework. It takes up key aspects of criticisms and provides stricter rules which support
the ongoing integration process. Concerning infrastructure provision and competition,
the new framework emphasizes the importance of the infrastructure as an enabler of
higher-quality services and as a key requirement for other industries. For internalizing
comprehensive externalities with infrastructure provision, the new Regulatory Package
allows infrastructure providers to take into account the cost of capital as a cost com-
ponent, which facilitates the internalization of externalities provided by infrastructure
investments in access price negotiations. Moreover, the new regulatory framework in-
creases regulatory independence from national governments.
However, it also provides some measures, which require further attention as the effec-
tiveness of these measures is unclear with the current stage of competition in the EU
member states (e.g. functional separation) and as they ignore differences between the
current stage of competition across EU member states.
5 Conclusion
I considered the alternative roles of the government in the context of providing a high-
quality telecommunication infrastructure and installing competition in infrastructure
and service markets. The telecommunication sector is considered to be a key sector
for other industries and, therefore, is also a key driver of economic growth. National
governments are aware of this relevance of telecommunications and, consequently, seek
to influence its development to meet national requirements most effectively. While gov-
ernmental interventions in the sector facilitate the internalization of externalities by
infrastructure providers, governments follow aims on the national level, which do not
necessarily correspond to the aims on the European level.
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Governments keep strong interrelationships with the telecommunication sector as they
provide telecommunication laws and determine the national transposition of European
guidelines. However, the transposition process has been repeatedly in the focus of criti-
cisms as competitors and also the EC charge the transposition process to be inefficient
and, thus, to benefit providers with larger market shares, mainly former monopolists.
Strong interrelations also exist between national regulators and the government, as na-
tional regulators are successor organizations of ministries or administrations when only
one telecommunication provider was active in a market with a low level of technological
deployment. As organizational structures of regulatory bodies strongly affect market
proximity, telecommunication companies criticize the competence of regulators’ employ-
ees and the decision process as being too slow and ignoring the actual challenges of
the markets. By adjusting organizational structures, some regulators reacted to these
aspects of criticism and, in doing so, found solutions for securing their knowledge stocks
independently from individual employees. The comparisons of these re-organized regu-
lators and "traditional" institutions provides evidence for much more efficiency with the
more flexible structure. Therefore, these countries are much less under suspicion of the
EC as is proven by the Implementation Reports.
Besides the jurisdictional relation of governments with the telecommunication sector,
governments are also active on the company- and the project level: Most EU member
states keep minority stakes of their former monopolists even today, which secures them
from unfriendly takeovers. However, governments follow mainly other aims with their
participations in telecommunication companies. As telecommunication infrastructure
is a key pre-requisite for innovations and investments on the service level and also in
other sectors, governments are interested in the provision of a high-quality telecom-
munication infrastructure. However, infrastructure providers can hardly internalize the
increasing externalities provided by their investments. National governments as well
as European administrations and sub-national governments reduce the challenge of in-
ternalizing investment externalities by providing public support for infrastructure roll-
out. While financial aid is the common type of support, non-financial support needs
particular attention as it leaves the analysis of investment chances and risks with the
(better-informed) investor. Although non-financial support is an accepted type of state
aid, the EC criticizes it of being in-transparent, which reduces the field of re-financing
investments and, therefore, is an issue to be considered in more detail in future work.
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Comparing the alternative roles of the governments provides evidence for a strong inter-
relationship of public administrations and governments with national telecommunication
markets. Combining the instruments of the alternative roles even increases the power of
national governments. While European administrations continuously try to reduce the
impact of national governments within the sector and foster market integration mainly
with regulatory requirements, the discussion provided here raises the question whether
the European integration process could benefit from the strong impact of national gov-
ernments on the national telecommunication sector.
The latest Regulatory Package takes up key points of criticism and offers new approaches
to meet obstacles with its predecessors. However, while competition is to a far extent in-
stalled on the service level, efficiency is a key issue to be addressed not only in regulated
markets. Moreover, it also has to be addressed in the national regulatory structures in
combination with transparency to foster the provision of investment incentives both to
increase innovations and to provide a high-quality infrastructure within and across all
EU member states.
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Appendix
Market Access and Privatization
Figure 5: Steps to Competition on EU-15 Telecommunication Markets
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The figure above shows the introduction of the EU Telecommunication Directives. The
most important directive was the 1996 Competition Directive which opened both infras-
tructure and voice transmission markets for competition.
The second line shows the entrance of the first competitor on fix-line telecommunication
markets. In most countries, new firms were allowed to enter the markets by the imple-
mentation of the EU Competition Directive in national law in 1998.
The last line shows the year when governmental ownership over the former monopolists
have been reduced for the first time. As could easily be seen, liberalization always oc-
curred after privatization in the countries under scrutiny.
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Infrastructure Competition and Investments –
a Comparison of Performance
Two main reasons exist why one observes European telecommunication markets in alter-
native stages of competition in different countries: 1) National member states have been
at a different competition status when the liberalization of European telecommunications
markets was implemented and 2) member states are obliged to adopt the EC directives
taking into account national distinctions. Due to these different starting points, the
EC has a strong interest in aligning the status of national markets for preparing the
integration to one European market. As national governments do not only pursue the
European integration policy but follow own national or also individual interests, their
actions affect the transposition process and also the national stage of competition.
Figure 6 displays the relation of DSL- and cable-based broadband access over time (Fig-
ure 7(a)) and unbundled access lines in relation to the total access lines available for
fix-line telecommunication networks (Figure 7(b)) over time. The first graph shows a
strong bulge for Germany and also for France, whereas the relation in smaller countries
is much more balanced, in particular for the Netherlands. Following Cave (2009), a
reason for the difference between facility-based competition in larger and smaller coun-
tries comes from the availability of cable access. For example, in Germany, cable has
been available only in cities and there is still no tendency of cable providers to roll-out
networks. Moreover, the German telecommunication incumbent held stakes in regional
cable companies until 2003, which might have delayed cable as a medium for internet
access as argued by the EC in multiple Implementation Reports. In France, a similar
situation is observable, where cable networks are also concentrated in major agglom-
erations. Following the 2002 Implementation Report, after 2001, investments slowed
down in France as the Conseil de la Concurrence, the French competition authority,
forced the incumbent to give access to its local loop infrastructure. However, municipal
administrations in less densely populated areas arranged with the telecommunication
incumbent to join investments based on bilateral agreements. Such new forms of financ-
ing DSL roll-out led to an ongoing increase of the gap between DSL and cable usage for
broadband access.
Due to the overall availability of low-speed telecommunication networks, a first-mover
advantage of DSL infrastructure over cable infrastructure exists, as investment costs
are lower for installing adequate transmission technology than for rolling out a new in-
frastructure. Exceptions are the Netherlands and also the UK where cable is nearly as
widely spread as telecommunication infrastructure.
While the last-mile physical infrastructure is commonly agreed to be a monopolistic
bottleneck (see e.g. Bauer, 2007, or Knieps, 2007), the access to frequency bands on this
infrastructure is particularly relevant for the take-up of local loop competition. Cave’s
ladder-of-investment model (Cave, 2006a) shows that new competitors enter a market,
firstly, getting access to an incumbent’s infrastructure by renting or leasing access ca-
pacity and, subsequently, building out own infrastructure. Thus, following Cave (2009),
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it is important to focus wholesale regulation on a few access elements, and to increase
the attractiveness for potential competitors to enter the local market. If they are able
to gain sufficient market shares subsequent physical infrastructure investments by new
entrants will follow. In a next step, it is therefore necessary to consider how local loop
unbundling has been introduced and guaranteed in EU member states.
In its Regulation No. 2887/2000, the EC provides a detailed description about how local
loop unbundling should be implemented on the national level, gives detailed information
about the elements included at the minimum and provides the date by which infrastruc-
ture owners are obliged to provide an offer to competitors, which is 31 December 2000.25
Figure 7(b) shows the local loop unbundling development expressed as the share of un-
bundled local loops per fix-line access paths. Although local loop unbundling should be
implemented to local loops at the earliest point in time when it is feasible, since 2000,
local loop unbundling is available only to about one fifth to one fourth of all lines in
2007. As local loop unbundling is the key requirement for providing competitive services
to customers, the EC suspects many former monopolists trying to delay the access for
new entrants.
Local Loop Competition - Comparison across EU Member States
Comparing the individual country developments with regard to market opening, the UK
is found to be the first country with actual local loop unbundling rules in place already
in 1997. However, OFTEL, the UK NRA, decided not to require access to raw copper
lines as it suspected competitors delaying the roll-out of own infrastructure otherwise.
In line with competition stimulation, the UK NRA required new entrants first to ne-
gotiate access prices to collocation points. Only if negotiations failed the NRA would
intervene. With regard to services on the lines, the NRA tied the vertically integrated
incumbent to allow ADSL provision only if, simultaneously, an adequate wholesale prod-
uct is available. While the UK market was lagging far behind other countries in terms
of competition, after around 2005 a strong catching-up of the local loop unbundling
market took place, as the incumbent functionally separated its service units from the
infrastructure units. Due to the separation, OFCOM, the successor of OFTEL, decided
to relax wholesale line rental regulation as it expected the market to be in a state of
competition.
Local loop unbundling has been implemented stepwise in Germany since 1998 based
on fully unbundled raw copper, whereas shared access and also sub-loop unbundling
(a particular necessity with the fiber-based Opal technology in Eastern Germany) was
denied. Concerning interconnection, the EC suspected the German incumbent system-
atically to delay the availability of a sufficient number of collocation points. Deutsche
Telekom offered ADSL services since mid-1999 and competitors were allowed to resale
ADSL products from the same point in time.
In France, the incumbent has offered retail ADSL services since November 1999. How-
25http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2000:336:0004:0008:EN:
PDF
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ever, wholesale offers were not available until an intervention by the French competition
authority in 2001, when the incumbent was obliged to unbundle its local loop for full
and shared access. Competitors complained about the comprehensive first-mover ad-
vantage of the incumbent, in particular, as ADSL was blocked by the incumbent even
after the decision. Nevertheless, the courageous intervention by the competition author-
ity resulted in a strong increase in unbundled access lines which is even stronger than
in other countries and led to the second highest rate of unbundled lines in the EU-15
(behind Finland).26
While local loop unbundling was implemented in the Netherlands in June 2000, about
90 percent of the unbundled lines were provided to a subsidiary of the incumbent. More-
over, until 2001, competitors claimed that the way of providing collocation points cir-
cumvented last mile competition as, firstly, too few collocation facilities were offered
in major agglomerations and, secondly, the incumbent gave no information about the
availability and characteristics of collocation facilities in advance. In consequence, the
incumbent and its subsidiary gained a comprehensive first-mover advantage over their
ADSL competitors. However, entrants can also use cable providers’ infrastructure to get
access to customers, but this infrastructure is not covered by the telecommunications
regulatory framework.
The Swedish incumbent opened its local loop voluntarily by offering local loop access
and collocation facilities without national regulatory interventions in March 2000. Thus,
competitors were able to negotiate full local loop access or shared access based on bilat-
eral contracts with Telia. However, Telia refrained from providing sub-loop access. Since
September 2001, Telia offers a wholesale ADSL product bundle for resale. Following the
EC, still too few competition existed in 2001 as the prices claimed by the incumbent
were too high both for local loop access and also for the wholesale ADSL offer. As
a high market concentration still existed in 2004, PTS, the Swedish NRA, intervened
ordering Telia to provide access to the local loop under non-discriminatory conditions
to all demanding companies.
26Ranking of the five countries considered here in 2007 (2003 (due to missing information for many
countries in 2002)): France: 2 (6), Germany: 3 (2), UK: 5 (14), Netherlands: 6 (5), Sweden: 7 (7).
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Figure 6: Fix-line Access Competition
80
70
60
40
50
30
20
10
0
2 000 2 001 2 002 2 003 2 004 2 005 2 006 2 007 2 008
France Germany Netherlands Sweden United Kingdom
(a) Facility-Based Competition
0 18
0.20
0.16
.
0.14
0 10
0.12
0.08
.
0.06
0 02
0.04
0.00
.
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
France Germany Netherlands Sweden United Kingdom
(b) Local Loop Access
Source: Data taken from the OECD Communications Outlook 2009
Ta
bl
e
2:
St
at
e
A
id
M
on
th
D
ay
Y
ea
r
So
ur
ce
C
ou
nt
ry
A
ff.
 C
om
p.
C
en
tr
al
 In
fo
rm
at
io
n
Fe
br
ua
ry
08
20
00
Th
e 
Ir
is
h 
Ti
m
es
U
K
A
 to
ta
l o
f p
ou
nd
s 1
20
 m
ill
io
n 
ha
s b
ee
n 
ea
rm
ar
ke
d 
fo
r g
ra
nt
 a
id
 to
 c
om
pa
ni
es
 in
st
al
lin
g 
br
oa
db
an
d 
fib
re
-o
pt
ic
 c
om
m
un
ic
at
io
ns
 
w
hi
ch
, a
cc
or
di
ng
 to
 M
s O
'R
ou
rk
e,
 w
ou
ld
 d
ra
w
 o
ut
 a
 to
ta
l i
nv
es
tm
en
t o
f o
ve
r e
ur
os
 5
00
 m
ill
io
n 
in
 b
rin
gi
ng
 b
an
dw
id
th
 to
 re
gi
on
s.
Ju
ne
22
20
00
Th
e 
Ir
is
h 
Ti
m
es
U
K
Th
e 
pr
oj
ec
t "
E-
co
m
m
er
ce
 a
nd
 A
dv
an
ce
d 
C
om
m
un
ic
at
io
ns
 S
ys
te
m
s M
ea
su
re
" 
w
ill
 re
ce
iv
e 
po
un
ds
 1
50
 m
ill
io
n,
 e
qu
al
ly
 sp
lit
 
be
tw
ee
n 
Ex
ch
eq
ue
r f
un
ds
 a
nd
 E
ur
op
ea
n 
R
ur
al
 D
ev
el
op
m
en
t f
un
ds
. T
he
 p
ro
je
ct
 w
ill
 e
nc
ou
ra
ge
 c
om
pa
ni
es
 to
 b
ui
ld
 o
ut
 ru
ra
l 
br
oa
db
an
d 
(h
ig
h-
sp
ee
d,
 h
ig
h 
ba
nd
w
id
th
) n
et
w
or
ks
, a
nd
 is
 e
xp
ec
te
d 
to
 a
dd
 u
p 
to
 1
50
,0
00
 "
fib
re
 k
ilo
m
et
re
s"
 to
 th
e 
St
at
e's
 
fib
re
-o
pt
ic
 n
et
w
or
k 
(b
ec
au
se
 m
an
y 
in
di
vi
du
al
 fi
br
es
 c
om
pr
is
e 
a 
fib
re
-o
pt
ic
 c
ab
le
, a
 k
ilo
m
et
re
 o
f c
ab
le
 e
qu
al
s s
ev
er
al
 fi
br
e 
ki
lo
m
et
re
s)
.
D
ec
em
be
r
04
20
00
N
or
di
c 
B
us
in
es
s R
ep
or
t
SE
Sw
ed
en
 is
 p
la
nn
in
g 
to
 in
ve
st
 S
EK
 1
0b
n 
in
 a
 p
ro
gr
am
m
e 
to
 se
t u
p 
a 
na
tio
nw
id
e 
br
oa
db
an
d 
ne
tw
or
k 
w
hi
ch
 w
ill
 re
ac
h 
th
e 
co
un
try
's 
re
m
ot
es
t v
ill
a g
es
, a
 g
ov
er
nm
en
t o
ff
ic
ia
l s
ai
d 
la
st
 w
ee
k
M
ar
ch
05
20
03
Th
e 
Ir
is
h 
Ti
m
es
EU
EU
 C
om
pe
tit
io
n 
C
om
m
is
si
on
er
, M
r M
ar
io
 M
on
ti,
 h
as
 g
iv
en
 th
e 
gr
ee
n 
lig
ht
 fo
r m
ill
io
ns
 o
f e
ur
os
 o
f g
ov
er
nm
en
t m
on
ey
 to
 b
e 
in
ve
st
ed
 in
 m
ob
ile
 te
le
ph
on
y 
an
d 
hi
gh
-s
pe
ed
 in
te
rn
et
 a
cc
es
s f
or
 p
oo
re
r r
eg
io
ns
A
pr
il
03
20
03
Th
e 
G
ua
rd
ia
n
U
K
W
he
n 
D
ur
ha
m
 c
ou
nt
y 
co
un
ci
l's
 n
ew
 h
ig
h-
sp
ee
d 
ne
tw
or
k,
 D
ur
ha
m
ne
t, 
is
 o
ff
ic
ia
lly
 la
un
ch
ed
 th
is
 sp
rin
g,
 it
 w
ill
 c
on
ne
ct
 sm
al
l 
bu
si
ne
ss
es
 a
nd
 h
om
es
 a
s w
el
l a
s s
ch
oo
ls
, l
ib
ra
rie
s a
nd
 c
ou
nc
il 
of
fic
es
. S
hr
op
sh
ire
 a
nd
 S
om
er
se
t c
ou
nt
y 
co
un
ci
ls
 h
av
e 
si
m
ila
r 
pl
an
s.
Ju
ne
06
20
03
U
til
ity
 W
ee
k
EU
D
es
pi
te
 c
ar
ry
in
g 
hu
ge
 d
eb
t, 
th
e 
O
EC
D
 sa
ys
 th
e 
te
le
co
m
s s
ec
to
r d
oe
sn
't 
ne
ed
 st
at
e 
ai
d 
an
d 
te
lc
os
 sh
ou
ld
 b
e 
le
ft 
to
 g
et
 o
n 
w
ith
 it
. 
Th
e 
C
om
m
is
si
on
 is
 a
lre
ad
y 
in
ve
st
ig
at
in
g 
w
he
th
er
 th
e 
Fr
en
ch
 g
ov
er
nm
en
t's
 c
re
di
t l
in
e 
to
 F
ra
nc
e 
Te
le
co
m
 b
re
ac
he
s s
ta
te
 a
id
 ru
le
s. 
Lo
ca
l l
oo
p 
un
bu
nd
lin
g,
 re
ce
nt
ly
 th
e 
su
bj
ec
t o
f a
 C
om
m
is
si
on
 ru
lin
g 
ag
ai
ns
t D
eu
ts
ch
e 
Te
le
ko
m
, i
s m
ak
in
g 
sl
ow
 p
ro
gr
es
s. 
Th
e 
O
EC
D
 u
se
s t
he
 e
xa
m
pl
e 
of
 b
ro
ad
ba
nd
 a
cc
es
s:
 'T
he
 p
re
ss
ur
e 
of
 re
gu
la
to
rs
 [o
n 
lo
ca
l l
oo
p 
un
bu
nd
lin
g]
 h
as
 e
ve
nt
ua
lly
 im
pr
ov
ed
 
co
nd
iti
on
s f
or
 c
om
pe
tit
io
n,
 a
nd
 n
ot
ab
ly
 h
el
pe
d 
re
du
ce
 th
e 
pr
ic
es
 c
ha
rg
ed
 b
y 
in
cu
m
be
nt
 o
pe
ra
to
rs
,' 
sa
ys
 th
e 
re
po
rt
A
ug
us
t
05
20
03
M
2 
Pr
es
sw
ire
U
K
D
ep
ar
tm
en
t o
f T
ra
de
 a
nd
 In
du
st
ry
 (D
TI
) p
la
ns
 to
 w
ire
 th
e 
pu
bl
ic
 se
ct
or
 fo
r b
ro
ad
ba
nd
 u
nl
ik
el
y 
to
 st
im
ul
at
e 
ne
w
 in
fr
as
tru
ct
ur
e 
in
ve
st
m
en
t a
nd
 m
a y
 b
re
ac
h 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 c
om
pe
tit
io
n 
ru
le
s (
po
un
ds
 1
 b
ill
io
n)
Se
pt
em
be
r
09
20
03
Te
le
co
m
 M
ar
ke
ts
U
K
Th
e 
U
K
 D
ep
ar
tm
en
t o
f T
ra
de
 a
nd
 In
du
st
ry
 (D
TI
) i
s r
ev
ie
w
in
g 
ho
w
 it
 w
ill
 a
w
ar
d 
la
rg
e 
ru
ra
l b
ro
ad
ba
nd
 c
on
tra
ct
s u
nd
er
 it
s 
B
ro
ad
ba
nd
 A
gg
re
ga
tio
n 
Pr
oj
ec
t, 
in
 re
sp
on
se
 to
 c
on
ce
rn
s t
ha
t i
ss
ui
ng
 su
ch
 c
on
tra
ct
s c
ou
ld
 b
re
ac
h 
co
m
pe
tit
io
n 
ru
le
s
Ja
nu
ar
y
12
20
04
Te
le
co
m
 M
ar
ke
ts
EU
FR
, E
U
A
 k
ey
 le
ga
l r
ul
in
g 
by
 th
e 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 c
ou
rt 
of
 ju
st
ic
e 
in
 m
id
-2
00
3 
- k
no
w
n 
as
 th
e 
A
ltm
ar
k 
ju
dg
m
en
t -
 il
lu
st
ra
te
d 
ho
w
 th
e 
SG
EI
 
co
nc
ep
t c
an
 b
e 
us
ed
 a
s a
 fr
am
ew
or
k 
fo
r b
ro
ad
ba
nd
-n
et
w
or
k 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t a
nd
 a
n 
al
te
rn
at
iv
e 
to
 st
at
e 
ai
d
Ja
nu
ar
y 
13
20
04
Te
le
co
m
 M
ar
ke
ts
U
K
B
T
In
 a
 b
id
 to
 a
ttr
ac
t s
om
e 
of
 th
e 
po
un
ds
 1
 b
ill
io
n 
(e
ur
os
 1
.4
 b
ill
io
n)
-p
lu
s i
n 
U
K
 g
ov
er
nm
en
t f
un
di
ng
 th
at
 h
as
 b
ee
n 
rin
gf
en
ce
d 
fo
r 
br
oa
db
an
d,
 B
T 
ha
s u
pp
ed
 it
s e
ff
or
ts
 to
 d
el
iv
er
 b
ro
ad
ba
nd
 a
cc
es
s t
o 
re
m
ot
e 
an
d 
ru
ra
l c
om
m
un
iti
es
 in
 th
e 
U
K
 b
y 
tri
al
lin
g 
fix
ed
 
w
ire
le
ss
 te
ch
no
lo
gy
 a
nd
 sl
as
hi
ng
 th
e 
pr
ic
e 
of
 o
ne
 o
f i
ts
 w
ho
le
sa
le
 D
SL
 p
ro
du
ct
s
A
pr
il
15
20
04
Th
e 
Ti
m
es
 
U
K
B
T
Th
e 
C
om
m
is
si
on
 is
 in
ve
st
ig
at
in
g 
a 
ch
ar
ge
 th
at
 B
T'
s r
at
es
 b
ill
 is
 c
al
cu
la
te
d 
at
 a
 ra
te
 o
f 2
 p
er
 c
en
t o
f r
el
ev
an
t r
ev
en
ue
s, 
w
hi
le
 ri
va
ls
 
pa
y 
up
 to
 2
7 
pe
r c
en
t. 
Th
e 
co
m
pl
ai
nt
, b
y 
V
te
ss
e 
N
et
w
or
ks
, a
lle
ge
s t
ha
t B
T 
sa
ve
d 
m
or
e 
th
an
 p
ou
nd
s 1
 b
ill
io
n 
on
 it
s r
at
es
 la
st
 y
ea
r. 
Th
e 
co
m
pa
ny
, w
hi
ch
 p
ro
vi
de
s h
ig
h-
ca
pa
ci
ty
 n
et
w
or
ks
 fo
r C
ity
 fi
na
nc
ia
l i
ns
tit
ut
io
ns
, c
ha
rg
es
 th
at
 B
T 
pa
id
 ra
te
s o
n 
its
 te
le
co
m
s 
ne
tw
or
k 
e q
ui
va
le
nt
 to
 ju
st
 p
ou
nd
s 2
50
 m
ill
io
n 
du
rin
g 
20
03
O
ct
ob
er
27
20
04
Sw
ed
is
h 
B
us
in
es
s D
ig
es
t
SE
Te
ra
co
m
Sw
ed
is
h 
Te
ra
co
m
 T
o 
C
on
st
ru
ct
 M
ot
al
a 
M
un
ic
ip
al
ity
 B
ro
ad
ba
nd
 N
et
w
or
k;
 S
w
ed
is
h 
st
at
e-
ow
ne
d 
br
oa
dc
as
te
r a
nd
 d
ig
ita
l T
V
 
pr
ov
id
er
 T
er
ac
om
 si
gn
ed
 a
 c
on
tra
ct
 to
 c
on
st
ru
ct
 th
e 
br
oa
db
an
d 
ne
tw
or
k 
in
 th
e 
m
un
ic
ip
al
ity
 o
f M
ot
al
a,
 so
ut
he
rn
 S
w
ed
en
, i
t w
as
 
re
po
rte
d 
on
 O
ct
ob
er
 2
6,
 2
00
4.
N
ov
em
be
r
17
20
04
Eu
ro
pe
an
 R
ep
or
t
FR
, U
K
Th
re
e 
pu
bl
ic
ly
-f
un
de
d 
br
oa
db
an
d 
In
te
rn
et
 a
cc
es
s p
ro
je
ct
s i
n 
th
e 
U
ni
te
d 
K
in
gd
om
 a
nd
 F
ra
nc
e 
ha
ve
 b
ee
n 
ap
pr
ov
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 
C
om
m
is
si
on
, i
n 
lin
e 
w
ith
 th
e 
eE
ur
op
e 
20
05
 a
ct
io
n 
pl
an
. T
he
 p
ro
je
ct
s, 
ap
pr
ov
ed
 o
n 
N
ov
em
be
r 1
6,
 h
av
e 
be
en
 se
t u
p 
in
 S
co
tla
nd
, i
n 
th
e 
Ea
st
 M
id
la
nd
s i
n 
En
gl
an
d 
an
d 
in
 th
e 
Fr
en
ch
 re
gi
on
 o
f P
yr
en
ee
s-
A
tla
nt
iq
ue
s
D
ec
em
be
r
12
20
04
Te
le
co
m
 M
ar
ke
ts
EU
FR
, E
U
Th
e 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 C
om
m
is
si
on
's 
gr
ee
n 
lig
ht
 o
n 
N
ov
em
be
r 8
 a
llo
w
in
g 
lo
ca
l m
un
ic
ip
al
iti
es
 to
 a
ct
 a
s a
 "
ca
rr
ie
r's
 c
ar
rie
r"
 fo
r a
 ru
ra
l 
br
oa
db
an
d 
pr
oj
ec
t i
n 
Fr
an
ce
's 
Py
re
ne
es
-A
tla
nt
iq
ue
s r
eg
io
n 
cl
ar
ifi
es
 st
at
e-
ai
d 
ru
le
s f
or
 so
m
e 
13
0 
Fr
en
ch
 ru
ra
l b
ro
ad
ba
nd
 p
ro
je
ct
s. 
It 
al
so
 h
as
 m
a j
or
 im
pl
ic
at
io
ns
 fo
r p
ro
je
ct
s t
hr
ou
gh
ou
t t
he
 E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
on
A
ug
us
t
09
20
04
Sw
ed
is
h 
B
us
in
es
s D
ig
es
t
SE
Te
lia
So
ne
ra
Sw
ed
is
h 
Te
lia
So
ne
ra
 N
et
w
or
k 
Sa
le
s A
B
, a
 su
bs
id
ia
ry
 o
f S
w
ed
is
h-
Fi
nn
is
h 
m
ob
ile
 te
le
co
m
s o
pe
ra
to
r T
el
ia
So
ne
ra
, s
ig
ne
d 
a
Sw
ed
is
h 
cr
ow
ns
 3
3 
m
ln
 (U
SD
 4
.3
 m
ln
/3
.6
 m
ln
 e
ur
o)
 c
on
tra
ct
 w
ith
 th
e 
m
un
ic
ip
al
ity
 o
f M
ar
k,
 so
ut
h 
w
es
te
rn
 S
w
ed
en
, t
o 
de
ve
lo
p 
br
oa
db
an
d 
in
fr
as
tru
ct
ur
e 
in
 th
e 
re
gi
on
, i
t w
as
 re
po
rte
d 
on
 Ju
ly
 2
2,
 2
00
4.
Se
pt
m
be
r
17
20
04
ZD
N
et
 F
ra
nc
e
FR
L'
un
 d
es
 p
lu
s a
m
bi
tie
ux
 c
ha
nt
ie
rs
 p
ub
lic
s d
e 
ré
se
au
 té
lé
co
m
s à
 h
au
t d
éb
it 
es
t e
n 
tra
in
 d
e 
to
ur
ne
r à
 l'
ai
gr
e.
 À
 P
au
, l
e 
ch
an
tie
r a
 1
0 
m
oi
s d
e 
re
ta
rd
 e
t i
l s
us
ci
te
 d
e 
vi
ve
s c
rit
iq
ue
s c
he
z 
ce
rta
in
s é
lu
s e
t e
nt
re
pr
en
eu
rs
. L
e 
pr
oj
et
 P
au
 B
ro
ad
ba
nd
 C
ou
nt
ry
 (P
B
C
) a
 d
u 
pl
om
b 
da
ns
 l'
ai
le
. C
en
sé
 é
qu
ip
er
 P
au
 e
t s
on
 a
gg
lo
m
ér
at
io
n 
du
 ré
se
au
 e
n 
fib
re
 o
pt
iq
ue
 «
le
 p
lu
s l
ar
ge
 d
e 
Fr
an
ce
»,
 il
 su
sc
ite
 
dé
so
rm
ai
s d
e 
vi
ve
s i
nq
ui
ét
ud
es
 c
om
m
e 
ZD
N
et
 a
 p
u 
le
 v
ér
ifi
er
 a
up
rè
s d
es
 e
nt
re
pr
is
es
 e
t d
es
 é
lu
s l
oc
au
x 
im
pl
iq
ué
s.
So
ur
ce
:
In
fo
rm
at
io
n
ta
ke
n
fr
om
Le
xi
sN
ex
is
.
N
ot
e
th
at
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
co
ul
d
be
in
co
m
pl
et
e
du
e
to
m
is
si
ng
pu
bl
ic
at
io
ns
in
th
e
da
ily
pr
es
s.
St
at
e
A
id
(c
on
tin
ue
d)
M
on
th
D
ay
Y
ea
r
So
ur
ce
C
ou
nt
ry
A
ff.
 C
om
p.
C
en
tr
al
 In
fo
rm
at
io
n
Ja
nu
ar
y 
28
20
05
U
til
ity
 W
ee
k
U
K
B
T
Th
e 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 C
om
m
is
si
on
 la
st
 w
ee
k 
la
un
ch
ed
 a
 p
ro
be
 in
to
 a
lle
ge
d 
st
at
e 
ai
d 
fo
r B
T 
in
 th
e 
fo
rm
 o
f a
 su
bs
id
y 
on
 th
e 
pr
op
er
ty
 ta
x 
le
vi
ed
 o
n 
th
e 
co
m
pa
ny
. '
W
hy
 d
oe
s B
T 
pa
y 
ta
x 
eq
ui
va
le
nt
 to
 a
 re
nt
al
 v
al
ue
 o
f p
ou
nd
s 1
6 
pe
r a
nn
um
 p
er
 lo
ca
l l
oo
p 
lin
e,
 b
ut
 h
as
 
su
bs
eq
ue
nt
ly
 c
ha
rg
ed
 o
th
er
 o
pe
ra
to
rs
 a
 re
nt
al
 o
f p
ou
nd
s 1
22
 p
er
 a
nn
um
 fo
r t
he
 sa
m
e 
lin
e,
 w
he
n 
bo
th
 re
nt
al
s s
ho
ul
d 
ha
ve
 b
ee
n 
ba
se
d 
on
 fa
ir 
m
ar
ke
t v
al
ue
s?
' P
au
l s
ai
d 
th
at
 si
nc
e 
B
T'
s t
ax
 w
as
 la
st
 a
ss
es
se
d 
in
 1
99
5,
 th
e 
di
sc
re
pa
nc
y 
am
ou
nt
ed
 to
 p
ou
nd
s 1
2 
bi
lli
on
.
M
ay
11
20
05
To
ta
l T
el
ec
om
FR
Th
e 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 C
om
m
is
si
on
 h
as
 a
pp
ro
ve
d 
eu
ro
s 8
5 
m
ill
io
n 
in
 g
ov
er
nm
en
t s
ub
si
di
es
 fo
r a
 g
ro
un
db
re
ak
in
g 
pu
bl
ic
 sc
he
m
e 
to
 
pr
ov
id
e 
br
oa
db
an
d 
ne
tw
or
ks
 to
 a
 ru
ra
l a
re
a 
of
 F
ra
nc
e.
Ju
ne
03
20
05
N
ew
sl
et
te
r D
M
Eu
ro
pe
U
K
D
M
E 
Lt
d.
Th
e 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 C
om
m
is
si
on
 h
as
 a
ut
ho
ris
ed
, u
nd
er
 E
U
 st
at
e 
ai
d 
ru
le
s, 
a 
U
K
 su
bs
id
y 
w
hi
ch
 a
im
s a
t b
rid
gi
ng
 th
e 
di
gi
ta
l d
iv
id
e 
be
tw
ee
n 
ar
ea
s o
f W
al
es
 th
at
 c
ur
re
nt
ly
 h
av
e 
br
oa
db
an
d 
co
m
m
un
ic
at
io
ns
 a
nd
 th
os
e 
th
at
 d
o 
no
t.
O
ct
ob
er
08
20
05
Eu
ro
pe
an
 R
ep
or
t
U
K
Th
e 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 C
om
m
is
si
on
 h
as
 a
ut
ho
ris
ed
 a
 st
at
e-
su
bs
id
is
ed
 p
ro
je
ct
 th
at
 a
im
s a
t b
rid
gi
ng
 th
e 
"d
ig
ita
l d
iv
id
e"
 in
 th
e 
U
ni
te
d 
K
in
gd
om
. F
un
di
ng
 is
 to
 b
e 
pr
ov
id
ed
 fo
r t
he
 e
xp
an
si
on
 o
f b
ro
ad
ba
nd
 c
om
m
un
ic
at
io
ns
 to
 re
m
ot
e 
ar
ea
s i
n 
th
e 
W
es
t M
id
la
nd
s, 
Ea
st
 
M
id
la
nd
s a
nd
 S
ou
th
 W
es
t r
e g
io
ns
, a
s p
ar
t o
f t
he
 U
K
 g
ov
er
nm
en
t's
 R
ur
al
 B
ro
ad
ba
nd
 A
cc
es
s P
ro
je
ct
O
ct
ob
er
24
20
05
A
FX
 In
te
rn
at
io
na
l F
oc
us
N
L
Th
e 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 C
om
m
is
si
on
 sa
id
 it
 h
as
 o
pe
ne
d 
a 
fo
rm
al
 in
ve
st
ig
at
io
n 
to
 a
ss
es
s w
he
th
er
 p
ub
lic
 fu
nd
in
g 
fo
r a
 fi
br
e 
ac
ce
ss
 n
et
w
or
k 
in
 th
e 
D
ut
ch
 to
w
n 
of
 A
pp
in
ge
da
m
 c
om
pl
ie
s w
ith
 E
C
 T
re
at
y 
st
at
e 
ai
d 
ru
le
s
N
ov
em
be
r
11
20
05
B
irm
in
gh
am
 P
os
t
U
K
A
 te
am
 fr
om
 th
e 
B
ru
ss
el
s o
ff
ic
e 
of
 H
am
m
on
ds
 h
as
 se
cu
re
d 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 C
om
m
is
si
on
 c
le
ar
an
ce
 fo
r A
dv
an
ta
ge
 W
es
t M
id
la
nd
s c
as
h 
ba
ck
in
g 
to
 p
ro
vi
de
 b
ro
ad
ba
nd
 in
 ru
ra
l a
re
as
.
M
ar
ch
21
20
06
A
us
tri
a 
To
da
y
EU
Th
e 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
on
 w
ill
 p
ro
vi
de
 c
as
h 
to
 b
ui
ld
 h
ig
h-
sp
ee
d 
In
te
rn
et
 a
cc
es
s i
n 
th
e 
co
nt
in
en
t´s
 le
ss
-d
ev
el
op
ed
 a
re
as
 to
 h
el
p 
se
t u
p 
ne
w
 b
us
in
es
se
s a
nd
 c
re
at
e 
jo
bs
. B
ru
ss
el
s a
pp
ro
ve
d 
se
ve
ra
l b
ro
ad
ba
nd
 p
ro
je
ct
s l
as
t y
ea
r t
ha
t r
ec
ei
ve
d 
st
at
e 
ai
d 
in
 B
rit
ai
n,
 S
pa
in
, 
A
us
tri
a 
an
d 
Ir
el
an
d.
Ju
ne
19
20
06
Th
e 
Ti
m
es
 (L
on
do
n)
U
K
B
T
B
T 
fa
ce
s t
he
 im
m
in
en
t t
hr
ea
t o
f a
 m
ul
tim
ill
io
n-
po
un
d 
fin
e 
fo
r a
lle
ge
d 
an
ti-
co
m
pe
tit
iv
e 
be
ha
vi
ou
r o
ve
r t
he
 p
ric
in
g 
of
 it
s 
hi
gh
-s
pe
ed
 in
te
rn
et
 a
cc
es
s.
Ju
ne
25
20
06
TT
-M
ag
az
in
e
FR
To
 c
ap
 a
 m
on
th
 o
f d
eb
at
e 
ab
ou
t s
ta
te
 in
te
re
st
 in
 n
ex
t g
en
er
at
io
n 
ne
tw
or
ks
, F
ra
nc
e's
 c
en
tra
l g
ov
er
nm
en
t s
ai
d 
it 
w
an
ts
 to
 tu
rn
 th
e 
co
un
try
 in
to
 a
 "
di
gi
ta
l r
ep
ub
lic
".
 In
 Ir
el
an
d,
 th
e 
Lo
rd
 M
ay
or
 o
f D
ub
lin
 is
 b
ac
ki
ng
 a
 c
ity
-w
id
e 
W
iF
i n
et
w
or
k 
to
 o
ff
er
 fr
ee
 o
r l
ow
-
co
st
 b
ro
ad
ba
nd
 a
cc
es
s. 
D
i g
iw
eb
 a
nd
 Ir
is
h 
B
ro
ad
ba
nd
 h
av
e 
ex
pr
es
se
d 
in
te
re
st
 in
 b
ui
ld
in
g 
th
e 
ne
tw
or
k,
 e
st
im
at
ed
 to
 c
os
t -
po
un
ds
 2
Ju
ly
19
20
06
IP
/0
6/
10
13
N
L
Th
e 
EC
 h
as
 d
ec
id
ed
 to
 p
ro
hi
bi
t, 
un
de
r E
C
 T
re
at
y 
st
at
e 
ai
d 
ru
le
s, 
pu
bl
ic
 fu
nd
in
g 
fo
r t
he
 p
la
nn
ed
 c
on
st
ru
ct
io
n 
of
 a
 fi
br
e 
ac
ce
ss
 
ne
tw
or
k 
in
 th
e 
D
ut
ch
 to
w
n 
of
 A
pp
in
ge
da
m
. T
he
 p
ro
je
ct
 c
on
ce
rn
s a
n 
ar
ea
 a
lre
ad
y 
se
rv
ed
 b
y 
br
oa
db
an
d 
ne
tw
or
ks
 a
nd
 th
e 
C
om
m
is
si
on
 c
on
si
de
re
d 
th
at
 th
e 
ai
d 
w
as
 n
ot
 n
ec
es
sa
ry
 to
 re
m
ed
y 
ei
th
er
 a
 m
ar
ke
t f
ai
lu
re
 o
r u
na
ff
or
da
bl
e 
pr
ic
es
 fo
r b
ro
ad
ba
nd
 
A
ug
us
t
08
20
06
To
ta
l T
el
ec
om
D
E
D
T
Th
e 
C
om
m
is
si
on
 h
as
 b
ee
n 
no
tif
ie
d 
of
 G
er
m
an
y'
s r
eg
ul
at
or
y 
in
te
nt
 c
on
ce
rn
in
g 
IP
 b
its
tre
am
, w
hi
ch
 in
cl
ud
e 
pr
ov
id
in
g 
IP
 in
te
rf
ac
e 
to
 7
3 
ci
tie
s, 
co
-lo
ca
tio
n 
ab
ili
tie
s a
nd
 p
ro
vi
di
ng
 se
rv
ic
es
 in
 a
 n
on
-d
is
cr
im
in
at
or
y 
m
an
ne
r.A
cc
or
di
ng
 to
 C
la
us
en
, t
he
 C
om
m
is
si
on
 
is
 n
ow
 li
ke
l y
 to
 re
sp
on
d 
by
 sa
yi
ng
 th
at
 th
e 
re
gu
la
to
ry
 c
on
di
tio
ns
 a
ls
o 
ha
ve
 to
 a
pp
ly
 to
 th
e 
V
D
SL
 n
et
w
or
k
D
ec
em
be
r 
21
20
06
A
FX
 In
te
rn
at
io
na
l F
oc
us
N
L
Th
e 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 C
om
m
is
si
on
 sa
id
 it
 h
as
 o
pe
ne
d 
an
 in
-d
ep
th
 in
ve
st
ig
at
io
n 
un
de
r a
id
 ru
le
s i
nt
o 
th
e 
ci
ty
 o
f A
m
st
er
da
m
's 
in
ve
st
m
en
t i
n 
its
 g
la
ss
 fi
br
e 
te
le
co
m
m
un
ic
at
io
ns
 n
et
w
or
k
D
ec
em
be
r
22
20
06
Eu
ro
pe
an
 R
ep
or
t
N
L
Th
e 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 C
om
m
is
si
on
na
nn
ou
nc
ed
 th
at
 it
 h
ad
 o
pe
ne
d 
an
 in
-d
ep
th
 in
ve
st
ig
at
io
n 
in
to
 th
e 
in
ve
st
m
en
t b
y 
th
e 
C
ity
 o
f A
m
st
er
da
m
 
in
 b
ui
ld
in
g 
a 
gl
as
s f
ib
re
 te
le
co
m
m
un
ic
at
io
ns
 n
et
w
or
k
M
ay
16
20
07
Ir
is
h 
In
de
pe
nd
en
t
U
K
Ir
el
an
d'
s p
la
ns
 fo
r b
ro
ad
ba
nd
 ro
ll-
ou
t i
n 
m
et
ro
po
lit
an
 a
re
as
 n
ee
d 
to
 b
e 
m
or
e 
cl
os
el
y 
ex
am
in
ed
 to
 e
ns
ur
e 
St
at
e 
ai
d 
ru
le
s a
re
 n
ot
 
be
in
g 
br
ok
en
, C
om
pe
tit
io
n 
C
om
m
is
si
on
er
 N
ee
lie
 K
ro
es
 sa
id
 y
es
te
rd
ay
N
ov
em
be
r
10
20
08
G
lo
ba
l M
ar
ke
ts
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
 C
en
tre
- G
lo
ba
l I
ns
ig
ht
 
D
E
N
ew
s a
ge
nc
y 
A
ge
nc
e 
Eu
ro
pe
 re
po
rts
 th
at
 th
e 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 C
om
m
is
si
on
 (E
C
) h
as
 g
iv
en
 a
 g
re
en
 li
gh
t f
or
 th
e 
st
at
e-
ai
d 
sc
he
m
e 
w
hi
ch
 
w
ou
ld
 a
llo
ca
te
 a
n 
ad
di
tio
na
l 4
5 
m
ill
io
n 
eu
ro
 fo
r i
m
pr
ov
in
g 
th
e 
av
ai
la
bi
lit
y 
of
 b
ro
ad
ba
nd
 se
rv
ic
es
 in
 th
e 
G
er
m
an
 c
ou
nt
ry
si
de
; t
he
 
su
bs
id
ie
s i
n 
qu
es
tio
n 
w
ill
 ta
rg
et
 ru
ra
l a
re
as
 in
 th
e 
st
at
es
 o
f S
ax
on
y,
 L
ow
er
 S
ax
on
y,
 a
nd
 B
av
ar
ia
. C
om
m
is
si
on
 sp
ok
es
pe
rs
on
 N
ee
lie
 
K
ro
es
 w
as
 q
uo
te
d 
on
 ru
ra
l c
on
ne
ct
iv
ity
: "
...
th
e 
C
om
m
is
si
on
 is
 c
on
vi
nc
ed
 th
at
 th
er
e 
is
 a
 g
en
ui
ne
 p
ro
bl
em
",
 a
dd
in
g 
th
at
 "
w
ith
ou
t 
st
at
e 
ai
d 
br
oa
db
an
d 
in
te
rn
et
 a
cc
es
s w
ou
ld
 n
ot
 b
e 
av
ai
la
bl
e 
in
 th
os
e 
ar
ea
s"
O
ct
ob
er
 
01
20
09
EU
R
O
po
lit
ic
s
FR
Th
e 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 C
om
m
is
si
on
 a
pp
ro
ve
d,
 o
n 
30
 S
ep
te
m
be
r, 
th
e 
pu
bl
ic
 c
o-
fin
an
ci
ng
, t
o 
th
e 
tu
ne
 o
f e
ur
os
 5
9 
m
ill
io
n,
 o
f t
he
 ro
ll-
ou
t 
of
 a
 p
as
si
ve
, n
eu
tra
l a
nd
 o
pe
n 
br
oa
db
an
d 
ne
tw
or
k 
co
ve
rin
g 
th
e 
en
tir
e 
Fr
en
ch
 d
ep
ar
tm
en
t o
f H
au
ts
-d
e-
Se
in
e,
 in
cl
ud
in
g 
th
e 
no
n-
pr
of
ita
bl
e 
ar
ea
s.
O
ct
ob
er
07
20
09
ht
tp
://
po
in
t-t
op
ic
.c
om
/c
on
te
nt
/
op
er
at
or
So
ur
ce
/p
ro
fil
es
2/
fr
an
ce
-b
ro
ad
ba
nd
-o
ve
rv
ie
w
.h
tm
FR
FT
In
 2
00
4,
 o
th
er
 o
pe
ra
to
rs
 c
ou
ld
 st
ar
t m
ar
ke
tin
g 
br
oa
db
an
d 
se
rv
ic
es
 w
ith
ou
t s
ub
sc
rip
tio
n 
to
 a
 tr
ad
iti
on
al
 p
ho
ne
 se
rv
ic
e 
in
 th
e 
ex
ch
an
ge
s t
he
y 
ha
d 
un
bu
nd
le
d.
 In
 2
00
6,
 n
ak
ed
 b
its
tre
am
 w
as
 m
ad
e 
av
ai
la
bl
e 
to
 c
om
pl
et
e 
fu
ll 
un
bu
nd
lin
g 
ou
ts
id
e 
of
 L
LU
 a
re
as
, 
w
hi
ch
 a
llo
w
ed
 a
lte
rn
at
iv
e 
ca
rr
ie
rs
 to
 e
xt
en
d 
th
ei
r n
ak
ed
 D
SL
 o
ff
er
s n
at
io
nw
id
e.
So
ur
ce
:
In
fo
rm
at
io
n
ta
ke
n
fr
om
Le
xi
sN
ex
is
.
N
ot
e
th
at
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
co
ul
d
be
in
co
m
pl
et
e
du
e
to
m
is
si
ng
pu
bl
ic
at
io
ns
in
th
e
da
ily
pr
es
s.
Regulation and Competition – the "Better" Regulatory Package?
In 2006, the EC started the revision of the Second Regulatory Package based on the
second round of market reviews and published its first proposal for adjustments in 2007
for consultations with interested groups. The second proposal was provided in November
2009, turned effective in December 2009 with its publication in the Official Journal of
the EU and has to be implemented to national laws by June 2011. The new guidelines
mainly rely on the 2002/2003 framework but extend it with a stronger concentration
on European-wide integration of telecommunication markets. Therefore, cross-national
harmonization of regulation is even more an issue than in the predecessor package.
In this section, I extend the introductory discussion of Section 4 by providing more in-
sights into the issues raised there and continue the consideration to the context of other
issues which are not necessarily the central point of consideration of this paper.
The new regulatory package demands transmission service providers to install measures
for a minimum level of infrastructure quality for internet services based on existing
transmission infrastructure equipment. With regard to consumer rights, the regulatory
package requires net neutrality in the sense that higher-quality services must not deter
the quality of other services. In line with this issue, consumers have to be informed
about the available infrastructure capacity and the "nature of the service to which they
are subscribing".27 In consequence, consumers have to be informed about traffic man-
agement systems and any other limitations which also includes the available (not the
maximum) transmission speed.
Besides these changes in contents, attention is given to particular issues which left room
for discussions and resulted in comprehensive workload for national courts under the Sec-
ond Regulatory Framework. The revised rules extend single paragraphs of the 2002/2003
articles in more detail and, thus, reduce the decision space of national governments and
regulators. In the following, I consider issues which have been discussed in line with the
Second Regulatory Package concerning infrastructure investments and access competi-
tion and which change in the new package.
Regulation and the Regulator
Even before the liberalization, NRAs and the EC have cultivated strong interrelation-
ships to exchange information on current issues with the regulatory implementation on
the national level. In line with the the Second Regulatory Package, the EC installed
the European Regulators Group (ERG), comprising the heads of the (currently) 27 EU
NRAs. This body should exchange information on national market developments and
consult the EC with the introduction of new regulatory rules. In contrast to the EC’s
aim of a common regulatory body, the ERG argues for regulatory sovereignty of national
regulators to guarantee the proximity to markets. Thus, the ERG constitutes a coun-
terbalance to the top-down regulation approach fostered by the EC.28
27http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/09/491&format=
HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en
28Please see also Chapter 2.
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The EC criticizes the role of the ERG as being too weak in the sense that it cannot
enforce a consistent application of regulatory rules across all EU member states. More-
over, the EC argues that the magnitude of various national approaches hamper market
integration.29 Due to the strong national sovereignty of regulators and their integral
role in national bureaucratic systems, the EC suspects the ERG not to fulfil its aims of
sufficiently consulting the process of pan-European regulation. In 2007, the EC therefore
proposed mainly three options to replace the ERG under the new European regulatory
system.30 The most comprehensive option was the installation of the Single European
Regulatory Authority (SERA) as an EU-wide regulator to replace national institutions
which has comprehensive decision powers for both national market interventions and also
cross-border interventions. A second option was a European regulator with increased
decision powers for national implementations of new regulatory rules. However, the role
of national regulators would be reduced only weakly. The last option required a better
co-ordination of NRAs in the existing framework of the ERG. Due to losing sovereign-
ties in the telecommunication sector, national governments refused all three options.
A compromising solution brought forward by the European Parliament in 2009 is the
establishment of the BEREC (Body of European Regulators of Electronic Communica-
tion).31 The BEREC is equipped with more complex regulatory powers than the ERG.
In particular, it has veto powers which are similar to the EC to overturn NRA decisions
if it suspects national decisions to favor companies with SMP.32 While the ERG was a
reporting and consulting unit to the EC, the BEREC takes over a supervisory role for
NRAs. Although it cannot directly intervene to stop governmental activities restricting
NRA decisions, the BEREC has the powers to intervene a posteriori.
However, concerns are raised in two directions on the role of the BEREC: Firstly, while
more comprehensive decision powers are given to this new regulatory body in comparison
to its predecessor, it is unclear whether existing habits will be changed as its members
are those of the ERG and as these members still underly the bureaucratic regimes in
their home countries. As the BEREC, i.e. the heads of NRAs, should control their own
national regulatory bodies, it is unclear how members will implement this ambiguous
task.
Secondly, following the argumentation of the German Monopolies Commission (2009),
the installation of the BEREC results in a Co-Regulation Regime which even enhances
the existing complexity of regulation as the BEREC has to agree on new national regula-
tory measures. Thus, while the primary intention with the BEREC was the installation
of a more powerful regulatory body to accelerate the pan-European integration process,
the decision process on the BEREC has mitigated its powers and makes the regulatory
process even more complex and, thus, more in-transparent.
29http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2007:0699:FIN:EN:PDF, p. 2
30http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/policy/ecomm/doc/library/proposals/ia_en.
pdf, p. 72ff
31http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/09/st03/st03675-re01.en09.pdf
32A more detailed description of the BEREC implementation process is provided in Broos et al. (2009).
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Market Integration and Fragmentation
Based on the situation before the liberalization with one monopolist providing country-
wide telecommunication services, governments chose also a common country-wide regu-
lation approach. However, since the liberalization, different developments across alter-
native sub-national markets in all EU member states can be observed, as new entrants
focussed on specific regions where they started to provide infrastructure and services.
Due to the different status of regions both with regard to technological deployment and
with regard to competition, governments and operators chose alternative sub-national
strategies to provide infrastructure access. Therefore, the new Regulatory Package also
proposes a sub-national market regulation approach as access costs differ across regions,
in particular in countries with lower population concentration. Several countries, such
as the UK or Austria, already employ sub-national measures to (de)regulate bitstream
markets (based on a three-markets classification).
Before regulation could be implemented on a sub-national level, transparent rules had
to be established which enable a sub-national market definition and which provide a
classification of sub-national competition performance. These rules must be defined on
the European level as the Third Regulatory Package proposes sub-national market def-
initions as a preparation for the pan-European integration. The UK chose sub-national
regulation on the level of MDFs as competitors enter regional markets on this level.
Following von Weizsäcker (2008), the results of alternative tests for market definitions
such as the SSNIP test or the question of collective market dominance support this level
of market definition.
An issue raised in sub-national regulation debates is inter-regional subsidization. Follow-
ing the opponents of sub-national market separations, infrastructure providers use higher
profits from urban areas for cross-funding investments in less competitive regions. By
separating markets on a sub-national level, competition in more densely-populated areas
increases as offers will even better meet customers’ characteristics, which reduces profits
for cross-funding (Heald, 1997). To overcome this challenge, Knieps (2007) proposes the
installation of a universal service fund. Taxes on prices in more densely populated areas
are used to cross-fund investments in less lucrative markets where investment projects
are auctioned.
In a nutshell, the pan-European integration process requires a complex preparation in
advance and cannot be implemented in a one-step approach. As discussed in this subsec-
tion, sub-national market separation could accelerate the integration process. As urban
areas are much more competitive than rural areas and, thus, could be used to refund in-
vestments also in less lucrative regions, it remains to be seen how the integration process
is affected by the stage of competition in alternative member states and how national
sovereignty affects the process of market definition.
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Functional Separation
Functional separation (or operational separation) has been discussed already in line with
the Second Regulatory Package (Section 3.2). The European Parliament proposes the
functional separation of the network unit from the retail and service unit. In contrast
to full (ownership) unbundling and legal unbundling, functional separation only requires
the separation of units while the vertical organizational structure of a company remains
in place. Thus, functional separation should guarantee a non-discriminatory infrastruc-
ture access for the integrated company’s service unit and for competitors’ demanding
access (Cave, 2006b; ERG, 2007). Following Article 13a of Directive 2009/140/EC33,
functional separation complements NRAs’ set of instruments and should be implemented
if other measures to install competition fail.
However, the EC provides no final definition of functional (i.e. operational) separation
and, thus, also provides no information about how to enforce and monitor functional
separation and the separated provider. With (perfect) functional separation, the service
unit of a vertically integrated operator competes with other operators on the service mar-
ket, whereas the network operator provides the essential upstream input but does not
discriminate between the own unit and competitors either in terms of access prices or in
terms of access conditions (Vickers, 1995). Nevertheless, the infrastructure provider has
an incentive to affect service competition if this benefits its own unit. With functional
separation and even with legal unbundling, a stricter type of separation, a regulator
can only partially monitor and intervene on the behavior of the infrastructure operator.
While price discrimination could be monitored and enforced under legal unbundling (not
under functional separation) (Höﬄer and Kranz, 2007a; Cremer et al., 2007), non-price
discrimination still remains an option for the infrastructure operator (Höﬄer and Kranz,
2007b; Nikogosian and Veith, 2010).
Following the Special Opinion of the German Monopolies Commission (2009), func-
tional separation could be a valuable instrument at most shortly after the liberalization
to foster competition and, therefore, is expectedly no option for governments and NRAs
today. Analyses of the Dutch and the Swedish NRAs come to the same result for their
national markets after the introduction of functional separation in the UK and in Den-
mark before 2007. In consequence, functional separation would be an option which
affects competition and infrastructure investments if NRAs could monitor and enforce
its strict implementation. However, following the examples in various countries and the
discussion in the literature, it will not be employed given the current stage of competi-
tion, at least in EU-15 telecommunication markets.
The new regulatory framework further promotes the process of pan-European integra-
tion by increasing decision powers of pan-European institutions and also by increasing
the independence of NRAs on the national level. The installation of the BEREC as
a pan-European regulatory body fosters the integration process. However, due to the
executive members of the board and their elections by national governments, the impact
of this new European regulatory body on the integration process has to be considered
with caution.
33Directive 2002/21/EC replaces the former Framework Directive (2002/21/EC).
45
With regard to the acceleration of the integration process, the EC has proposed to switch
from the existing national regulation pattern to sub-national regulation. In doing so,
regulation could be reduced or abolished in regions where markets turn to a competitive
stage, whereas regulation could be fostered in less competitive markets. Such an ap-
proach bears some challenges in advance in particular for larger countries with a lower
population concentration. However, from an economic perspective, it enables providers
in sub-national markets with higher concentration to negotiate access without further
legal obligations, whereas regulators can concentrate on less-competitive markets.
To sum up, the Third Regulatory Package takes up major problems in line with its
predecessor. While some pitfalls continue to exist, this new framework enables a further
key step to competition and efficiency and, in particular, to the pan-European market
integration.
Data and Information Collection
Data and information for the analysis are collected from multiple sources:
 Data on public ownership (Figure 1) is taken from the OECD Regulatory Index.
 Information on local loop competition and facility-based competition (Figure 6) is
provided in the OECD Communications Outlook 2009.
 The EC Implementation Reports provide an overview of national regulation as
well as the implementation of EU guidelines and the progress of adoption of the
EU Regulatory Packages to national laws. Information on national lawmaking in
line with the pan-European steps to market integration (Table 1) is taken from
the yearly Implementation Reports since 1997.
 State aid information is collected from the newspaper retrieving system LexisNexis,
which provides information based on a keyword search.
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